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Abstract in English 
The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs has proposed to replace the currently implemented 
structure of legal unbundling of the energy distribution industry by ownership unbundling. In 
this study we analyse costs and benefits of this proposal, compared to the current situation, and 
to two alternative options that strengthen legal unbundling. We identify four mutually-related 
categories of benefits: better performance of networks, more efficient regulation, improved 
effectiveness of  competition, and benefits of privatisation; and three categories of costs: one-
off transaction costs, loss of economies of scope and the risk of less investment in generation. 
The analysis highlights that the benefits depend on the future development in small-scale 
generation and on allocation of the management of transmission networks. Mainly because of 
the uncertainty about the future role of small-scale generation and the uncertainty about the 
magnitude of the one-off transaction costs related to cross-border leases, the net welfare effect 
of ownership unbundling at the distribution level is ambiguous. We identify an alternative route 
for achieving some of the benefits considered. 
 
Key words: network industries, electricity, restructuring, ownership unbundling  
Abstract in Dutch 
Deze studie bevat een analyse van de kosten en baten van het voorstel van de Minister van 
Economische Zaken om de energiedistributiebedrijven volledig af te splitsen in 
netwerkbedrijven en bedrijven die zich op handel en/of productie richten. We vergelijken dit 
voorstel met de huidige juridische splitsing en met twee sterkere vormen van juridische 
splitsing. Volledige splitsing leidt tot betere prestaties van netwerkbedrijven, efficiëntere 
regulering en effectievere concurrentie in het geliberaliseerde deel van de sector. Bovendien 
schept het de mogelijkheid commerciële activiteiten te privatiseren. Tegenover deze baten staan 
kosten, zoals eenmalige transactiekosten, kosten van het verliezen van synergie en een 
mogelijke tijdelijke vermindering van investeringen in productie. Er blijkt dat de baten 
afhankelijk zijn van de toekomstige ontwikkeling van kleinschalige productie en van de vraag 
of het beheer van transmissienetten aan de landelijke netbeheerder wordt overgedragen. Met 
name vanwege onzekerheid over de toekomstige ontwikkeling van de kleinschalige productie 
en over de eenmalige transactiekosten is het welvaartseffect van de eigendomssplitsing van 
distributienetten niet eenduidig. Wij bespreken een alternatieve route om sommige baten van de 
eigendomsplitsing te bereiken met bestaande instrumenten. 
 
Steekwoorden: netwerksectoren, elektriciteitssector, herstructureren, eigendomsplitsing  
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Preface 
The intention of the Dutch government to impose ownership unbundling on the incumbent 
energy distribution firms has raised a fierce debate between adherents and opponents of this 
proposal. Although the debate has brought forward many arguments both in favour of and 
against ownership unbundling, a clear picture of the net effects of this change in the ownership 
structure has not been achieved yet. Given the potentially far-reaching consequences of this 
measure radically changing the structure of the energy industry, a systematic analysis of costs 
and benefits is necessary according to many participants in the debate. The CPB, therefore, has 
started a research systematically analysing conceivable effects of several options to unbundle 
the energy-distribution industry. 
 
Although this research is mainly based on desk research of economic literature on vertical 
organisation of industries as well as publications specifically focused on the case of the Dutch 
energy-distribution industry, we have also had several useful discussions with a number of 
participants in the debate. In particular, we thank Bart Brouwer, Sander de Jong and Jaco 
Stremler of the Ministry of Economic Affairs for all the information submitted on the Minister’s 
proposal and the comments received on draft versions of this report. We thank Frans 
Rijkschroeff and Michiel Veersma of the energy regulator, DTe, and Daan Vrijmoet of the 
telecom regulator, OPTA, for the useful discussions on alternative options for unbundling and 
the impact of unbundling on regulation. This discussion was focused on the issues of regulatory 
tasks under the Electricity Law and experiences with regulating and enforcing the current 
unbundling requirements. Dirk Brouwer and Willem de Boer of the investment consultancy 
Sequoia informed us about relationships between ownership structure and value of firms, we are 
grateful to them. We thank Hans Huygen of Essent and Winfred Knibbeler of Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer for the discussion on draft conclusions of our report. We are indebted to 
Michael Pollitt of the University of Cambridge, and Alejandro Hernandez Alva and Yanhua 
Zhang of the University of Toulouse for their valuable comments on a draft version of this 
document. Finally, we thank all other people who provided us with useful information. The 
responsibility for the content and the conclusions of this report is, of course, entirely ours. 
 
Besides the authors of this report, Mark Lijesen, Victoria Shestalova and Machiel Mulder 
(project management), two other colleagues of the sector Competition and Regulation, notably 
Marcel Canoy and Gijsbert Zwart, contributed to this report by participating in the many 
discussions during the project. 
 
Henk Don 
Director   8 
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Summary 
Scope of our research 
The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs has proposed to replace the currently implemented 
structure of legal unbundling in the energy distribution industry by ownership unbundling. 
Dutch regional utility holdings, whose ultimate owners are local authorities, are vertically 
integrated firms including regional distribution companies as well as commercial businesses, 
such as production and retail. The three largest utility holdings produce currently about 40% of 
electricity in the Netherlands and have a large share in retail, especially in the market for small 
customers. In addition to several vertically integrated regional firms, there are also other 
companies active in production and/or retail activities in the Dutch electricity market. 
 
When an electricity firm is active in several vertically related businesses, including the network 
business, it can exploit the superior position of the network to influence the situation in the 
market. Therefore, the last EU Electricity Directive has strengthened unbundling requirements 
for distribution networks and has required legal unbundling. In the Netherlands, distribution 
networks are legally unbundled from the holdings. The Minister of Economic Affairs proposes 
to make this separation stronger, in particular, to introduce ownership unbundling.  
 
In this study we analyse costs and benefits of this proposal, compared to the current situation. 
The current situation is referred to as Legal-Lean, because many networks are ‘lean’ companies, 
i.e. having no economic ownership of their assets and almost no personnel. Besides the current 
Legal-Lean unbundling structure and the structure of ownership unbundling, we include in the 
analysis two intermediate unbundling options, Legal-Fat and Legal-Fat Plus respectively. In the 
first alternative, networks have the economic ownership of their assets, and a proper division of 
the activities between the network and other companies is introduced. In the second alternative, 
financial ring fencing is added, implying that the financing capacities of the network firms are 
protected. In this option, a network firm is still part of the holding while the holding is able to 
influence the management of the network firm. These options are included in order to see which 
benefits can be achieved by less strong unbundling and at which cost.  
 
We conduct an analysis of possible effects of these unbundling options. As each option has 
specific strong and weak points, we focus on describing the trade-offs between benefits and 
costs of each option. This analysis is of a highly qualitative nature because these types of 
restructuring measures are inherently hard to assess. While there are relatively many examples 
of the implementation of ownership unbundling for national transmission networks in different 
countries, the empirical evidence on such measures for distribution networks is scarce.   10 
Benefits and costs of alternative unbundling options 
When comparing the four alternative options introduced above, we identify several welfare 
effects, which we classify into ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’. The benefits of unbundling relate to the 
improved performance of networks, more efficient regulation, and improved effectiveness of 
competition. Furthermore, ownership unbundling creates the possibility of privatising 
commercial activities, which separates the role of the government and private parties in the 
market segment of the industry. In addition to benefits there are also costs. We distinguish one-
off transaction costs, loss of economies of scope and the risk of less investment in generation. 
We discuss each cost and benefit below.  
Benefit: unbundling raises independence and, hence, performance of networks 
Unbundling creates a more independent position of the network, which improves the network 
performance through a better focus on the objectives of the network and a better response to 
regulatory incentives. Making network companies ‘fat’ creates more transparency with respect 
to the network assets. This and a proper allocation of the strategic tasks will decrease the 
interference with the holdings and secure a better performance of the network. Therefore, a 
stronger unbundling form generates a larger improvement in this respect.  
Benefit: effectiveness of regulation increases 
We distinguish two effects of unbundling on regulation: effect on tariff regulation and effect on 
the market monitoring task of the regulator. More unbundling is beneficial for both. Therefore, 
stronger unbundling options deliver more of this benefit. The largest improvement is achieved 
under the ownership unbundling option, since this option removes last cross-subsidies and all 
remaining links.  
Benefit: improved competition, possibly large welfare effects on wholesale market 
Both improved independence of networks and increased effectiveness of regulation affect 
competition. In analysing this impact, we distinguish the retail segment and the wholesale 
segment. The effect of unbundling on the wholesale market appears to be more important.  
 
A higher degree of unbundling of generation and transmission networks enhances the position 
of new entrants in large-scale generation and may lead to substantial welfare gains. Since the 
current distribution companies also operate a part of the transmission grid, ownership 
unbundling of such companies secures their independence, which is important for a good 
functioning of the wholesale market. If the management of the regional transmission grid as 
from 110 kV is allocated to the national TSO, as the Dutch government has proposed, the effect 
of unbundling distribution companies for the wholesale market is smaller. Still, unbundling of 
generation and distribution networks increases the opportunities for small-scale producers to 
compete in the electricity market, which is especially relevant if the concept of virtual utilities is   11 
further developed in practice. Such a development is more likely if there is much entry in 
distributed generation, which is also facilitated by stronger unbundling of distribution networks. 
Although ownership unbundling may result in sales of generation owned by Dutch utilities to 
foreign firms, this is unlikely to have a large effect on competition on the North-Western 
European power market. 
 
With respect to retail markets, unbundling is likely to promote entry. Even though the net 
welfare gains achieved in retail markets are likely to be small, unbundling may tackle a 
potential tight oligopoly in this market segment. The impact of ownership unbundling on further 
consolidation in the Dutch retail market due to possible takeovers after unbundling is probably 
negligible because of the currently high level of concentration. This threat of increased 
consolidation is likely to be dealt with by the competition authority.  
Benefit: ownership unbundling enables privatisation of commercial activities 
Currently, public authorities own the vertically integrated energy distribution firms. As a result, 
commercial activities, i.e. generation and supply, are conducted by firms in public hands. 
Ownership unbundling enables (public) shareholders to sell their shares in the commercial 
firms, while retaining their shares in the network firm. This generates a more clear division 
between the role of the government and activities of market parties in the liberalised part of the 
industry. Moreover, selling commercial activities of the energy holdings to private parties could 
generate an additional benefit, notably making these firms more sensitive to pressure from 
shareholders. Another possibility to achieve this benefit can be realised through changing 
corporate governance to facilitate the possibility of voluntary unbundling initiated by public 
owners.  
 
Cost: risk of large one-off transaction costs 
As unbundling involves a change in the structure of the industry, one-off transaction costs will 
occur. The improvement of legal unbundling would already give rise to some of these costs, as 
several alterations would have to be implemented, such as the reorganisation of the former 
common shared call centres. Both Legal-Fat Plus and Ownership unbundling give rise to 
additional one-off transaction costs, in particular costs following from changing the cross-
border leases that some companies concluded in the past. There is uncertainty regarding the 
magnitude of these costs, due to confidential information about the current contracts and 
uncertainty regarding the possible reaction of American investors to unbundling. 
Cost: ownership unbundling hardly results in additional loss of economies of scope 
In the electricity industry, synergies between different activities occur because of economies of 
scope. The latter exists if integration of different types of activities reduces average costs. We 
distinguish operational and financial synergy. When comparing the four policy options with   12 
respect to operational economies of scope, we conclude that the main cost of losing such 
economies of scope arises with introducing a proper task allocation. Additionally, ownership 
unbundling adds only small extra cost. The effect of financial synergy is mainly allocative and 
not on total welfare. 
Cost: investment in generation is hardly affected 
Unbundling possibly affects the financial ability of the (currently) integrated firm to invest in 
generation. However, this effect on investment in generation is likely to be small and 
temporary. More than 50% of all generation capacity is owned by other parties than the 
vertically integrated firms. As a result, total investment in power plants depends on far more 
factors than the financing capacities of the integrated firms.  
Conclusion 
Ownership unbundling strongly increases independence of network management, fostering the 
focus of network companies on their direct activities and leading to a better performance of 
networks. In addition, unbundling raises the efficiency of regulation. As a result, competition 
becomes more effective. The welfare effect of the improved competition in the retail market is 
probably small, while benefits of ownership unbundling are likely to be larger in the wholesale 
market. The magnitude of the latter benefits depends on the future development of small-scale 
generation and the separation of the transmission grid. Furthermore, ownership unbundling 
enables privatisation of commercial activities, which generates a more clear distinction between 
the role of the government and activities of market parties in the liberalised part of the industry. 
 
The realisation of these results is, of course, not a free lunch. Ownership unbundling reduces 
economies of scope and, furthermore, creates possibly large one-off transaction costs. There is 
uncertainty about the size of the one-off transaction costs caused by the impact of unbundling 
on the current cross-border leases. Unbundling may also affect investments in generation by the 
currently vertically integrated Dutch utility holdings, but this is unlikely to affect overall 
investment in power plants. 
 
Mainly because of the uncertainty about the future role of small-scale generation and the 
uncertainty about the magnitude of the one-off transaction costs related to the cross-border 
leases, the net welfare effect of ownership unbundling at the distribution level is ambiguous. 
Ownership unbundling is not the only option to realise some of the benefits mentioned above. 
By improving current structures, such as regulatory surveillance, competition policy, and 
corporate governance, both the performance of networks and competition in the market segment 
of the industry can be improved, while (public) shareholders can obtain the option to withdraw 
from risky, commercial activities. Postponing the decision on the form of unbundling would, 
however, result in prolonging uncertainty about the future structure of the industry.   13 
1  Introduction 
1.1  Policy debate in the Netherlands and goal of this research 
The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs has proposed to replace the currently implemented 
structure of legal unbundling in the energy distribution industry by ownership unbundling of 
networks from commercial activities. According to his letters to the House of Parliament
1, legal 
unbundling is unable to fully guarantee free access to the network by new entrants and adequate 
investment in the grid. Despite regulatory measures, legal unbundling would not completely 
prevent influence of the vertically integrated holdings on activities of network firms. Due to 
remaining links between network and other activities and the presence of asymmetric 
information, regulation faces difficulties in removing all ways of mutual influence. As a result 
of this influence, incumbent distribution firms could still hinder competition by deterring 
potential entrants or favouring own commercial activities.  
 
In the view of the Minister, ownership unbundling is necessary to facilitate competition as well 
as efficiency of network management. In addition, ownership unbundling might enable the 
current ultimate shareholders - regional public authorities - to sell their shares in production 
and supply, raising both liquidity of regional public authorities and incentives for efficiency in 
these parts of the holding. 
 
The proposal to introduce ownership unbundling has induced a fierce debate on the pros and 






6 as well as 
researchers.
7 Despite all these interactions of views, a clear picture of the consequences of the 
full unbundling of the energy distribution firms has not been achieved yet.  
 
1 The Minister of Economic Affairs, letters to the House of Parliament , Kamerstukken II, 2003 – 2004, 28982, nr.18 (March 
2004) and nr. 29 (October 2004).  
2 See e.g. a letter of a former CEO of Eneco in Het Financieele Dagblad, “Energieplan Brinkhorst is goed voor economie”, 
May 12, 2004. 
3 See e.g. a letter of the three large incumbents (Essent, Nuon and Eneco) in Het Financiële Dagblad, “Vernieling 
energiesector”, November 25, 2004. 
4 See e.g. a letter of Crone, a member of the House, in Het Financieele Dagblad, “Neem locale overheden als 
aandeelhouders serieus”, December 12, 2004. 
5 See e.g. a letter of lawyers of Van Doorne NV in Het Financieele Dagblad, “Brinkhorst, bekijk nog eens goed noodzaak 
splitsing energiesector”, October 28, 2004. 
6 See e.g. the report “Net nog niet” of the Energieraad, December 2003, in which this body advises to take any decision on 
unbundling in a European context. 
7 See e.g. Baarsma et al., 2004 in Het Financieele Dagblad, “Stop de gedwongen splitsing van de elektriciteitsbedrijven”, 
December 12, 2004, concluding that the enforced separation of distribution firms should be stopped until a systematic cost-
benefit analysis has been conducted, and Van Damme et al., 2004, concluding that the proposal of the Minister will hardly 
affect competition on the retail market while it will significantly influence ownership structure, raising questions about the 
proportionality of this measure.   14 
The aim of this research is, therefore, to deliver a systematic analysis of conceivable effects of 
several options to unbundle the energy distribution industry. We will not only deal with the 
option of ownership unbundling, but also analyse options to improve legal unbundling by 
additional behavioural measures.  
 
Before giving more detail about the scope of our research, we describe the issue in the 
remainder of this chapter. First, we present an overview of institutional choices made elsewhere 
in the European Union, and in particular in the Netherlands. Next, we go further into the options 
to structure the Dutch energy distribution industry. Finally, we describe the scope of our 
research and the structure of the report. 
1.2  European context 
The introduction of competition in the energy industry in European countries, as in other 
industries, has strongly been encouraged by initiatives of the European Union. The European 
Union has published several directives prescribing steps towards competition to be taken by 
member countries. These steps include restructuring of the industry, design and opening of 
markets as well as introduction of regulation. The issue of ownership, in particular privatisation, 
has not been dealt with by the EU Electricity Directives until now. 
 
The restructuring issue refers to both vertical and horizontal organisation. Although the 
potentially adverse effects of concentrated markets are widely acknowledged, the EU Electricity 
Directives have not required horizontal separation. In addition, due to the absence of proactive 
regulation and control, the electricity market has shown an ongoing process of concentration, 
which may seriously limit effectiveness of competition (Jamasb, et al., 2005).
8 
 
Regarding the vertical structure of the energy industry, several countries initially introduced 
weak forms of unbundling in the electricity industry, notably accounting unbundling and 
management (organisational) unbundling, following the first EU Electricity Directive (1996). 
Some countries already implemented legal unbundling, although this more strict form of 
unbundling was formally introduced in the second EU Electricity Directive adopted in June 
2003. Table 1.1 offers an overview of the currently implemented vertical unbundling models of 
electricity and gas distribution networks in some European countries. It follows from this table 
that so far, ownership unbundling of the energy distribution networks has only been 
implemented in one country of the European Union, i.e. the United Kingdom. The ownership 
unbundling in the British gas industry, is not the result of legislation, but has been implemented 
voluntarily. The former monopoly supplier, British Gas, has been split into production, supply 
 
8 In many European countries, the share of the largest three generation firms in generation is above 60%, while comparable 
figures exist for the retail market (Jamasb et al., 2005).   15 
and transportation business. The National Grid Transco is currently about to sell four of their 
distribution business. This sale has been conditionally approved by Ofgem. 
Table 1.1  Unbundling models of energy distribution networks in several European countries  
































         
















Source: EC (2005) Fourth benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas markets.  
Notes: New EU members are not included here. They typically feature a somewhat lower degree of unbundling. In electricity, Norway 
applies legal unbundling in the case of mergers between distribution companies; Brussels region in Belgium is not yet legally unbundled. 
 
For transmission system operators, many countries have chosen for legal or ownership 
unbundling, since TSOs perform the most crucial market facilitating functions and need a high 
degree of independence. Still there are some countries, e.g. Germany (accounting unbundling of 
TSO in the gas industry), lagging behind this development. The sluggishness in the 
restructuring processes in national energy industries may be a concern for the formation of the 
European energy market. 
1.3  Current structure and options for unbundling in the Netherlands 
The Dutch transmission system operator TenneT is fully separated from commercial electricity 
generators and traders. This TSO is entirely owned by the state government. TenneT currently 
manages 100% of the high-voltage network of 220 and 380 kV lines, of which it owns 58% and 
90% respectively. In addition, TenneT owns and manages 12% of the 150 kV network. The rest 
of the 150kV grid and all the lower voltages are owned and managed by regional distribution   16 
companies
9. Table 1.2 gives more detail regarding the division of the lines beginning from 
50kV across the companies. 
Table 1.2  Ownership and management of Dutch electricity lines from 50kV, by voltage, 2003 
  50kV  110kV  150kV  220kV  380kV 
           
% Owned by TSO (TenneT)  0.0  0.0  12.4  58.2  90.1 
% Managed by TSO (TenneT)  0.0  0.0  12.4  100.0  100.0 
           
Ownership of lines per company, in km 
TenneT  0  0  542  379  1803 
Delta  213  0  281  0  94 
Eneco  638  0  278  0  0 
Essent  67  1496  1432  140  105 
Nuon  2020  475  1849  146  0 
Total in the Netherlands  2938  1971  4328  638  2002 
           
Source: DTe division of regions across companies of August 18, 2003 and the annual report of TenneT of 2003. 
 
Regional distribution companies, whose ultimate owners are local authorities, are vertically 
integrated firms which are active in generation, network and supply.
10 There are three large 
electricity distribution companies: Essent, Nuon and Eneco. Together, these firms deliver to end 
users more than 80% of the electricity. About 10% is delivered to end users by TenneT, while a 
number of small distribution companies, with Delta Energy as the largest one, distribute the 
remaining part.
11 The three largest electricity distributors generate approximately 40% of the 
electricity. In addition, they have a large share in the supply, especially in the market for small 
customers, where their share is about 90%.  
 
At present, network management and commercial activities of the regional companies are 
legally unbundled. However, the network firms are ‘lean’, i.e., they do not have economic 
ownership of their assets. Also the tasks of the network firm and the other firms within the 
holdings are not fully separated. As the regulator faces difficulties in guaranteeing full 
independence of network management from other parts of the holding, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs has proposed to introduce ownership unbundling, which structurally 
eliminates any influence of holdings on distribution companies.  
 
The current form of legal unbundling and the ownership unbundling option do not exhaust all 
options for unbundling the energy distribution industry. In addition to these options, 
intermediate options can be distinguished in which a more clear division of tasks and 
 
9 According to the proposal of the Minister, in the near future, the complete network of 110 and more kV will be managed by 
TenneT. 
10 In chapter 3, more detail information is given on the current industrial structure of the Dutch energy industry. 
11 The term ‘distribution’ refers to the transport of energy to end users, while the term ‘supply’ refers to retail sales of energy 
to end users.   17 
responsibilities is specified for the network manager. Following suggestions from DTe (2004b), 
we define two intermediate options between the current situation and ownership unbundling. 
Consequently, we have four alternative options for unbundling:  
 
a)  Legal-Lean: legal unbundling with lean network managers, which is the current structure of 
most energy-distribution firms; 
b)  Legal-Fat: legal unbundling with fat network managers, i.e. network firms with a proper 
allocation of tasks and the economic ownership of their assets, without independent financing 
capabilities; 
c)  Legal-Fat Plus: legal unbundling with fat network managers and a financial ring fence between 
the network and commercial activities; 
d)  Ownership: Full ownership unbundling of the network and commercial activities. 
 
The new options b) and c) feature ‘legal unbundling with a fat network manager’, i.e. network 
firms with economic ownership of their assets. We assume that these intermediate options 
implement a proper division of tasks between the network and other businesses, allocating 
strategic tasks to the network manager.  
 
The difference between the Legal-Fat option and the Legal-Lean option is that in the Legal-Fat 
option the network firm executes all strategic activities while it also has the network assets on 
its balance sheet. The Legal-Fat Plus option differs from the Legal-Fat option as in the former 
financial ring-fence of the network firm is added. The measure secures sufficient financing for 
network activities. In the Ownership option, there is full independence. The holdings lose 
ownership rights with respect to the network. For example, this option also prevents the 
holdings from having informal powers that may affect the choice of the board of directors of 
network companies. We will go deeper in detail of each option in chapter 3. 
 
In addition to ownership unbundling between network and commercial activities, the Minister 
has proposed to reallocate the management of all networks at and above 110 kV (hereafter 
‘regional transmission networks’) to TenneT. This part of the proposal represents another 
dimension of unbundling (between two network activities) and can be implemented 
independently from the four policy options that we discussed above. However, costs and 
benefits of each of the four policy options depend on the implementation of this part of the 
proposal. Therefore, when analysing the four policy options, we will discuss possible effects of 
this part of the proposal.  
   18 
1.4  Scope of research and structure of the document 
In this document, we analyse the effects of several options for vertical separation of the 
distribution network from commercial activities. As each option has specific strong and weak 
points, it is hardly possible to define the optimal structure. Therefore, we focus on describing 
the trade-offs between benefits and costs of each option for restructuring, instead of looking for 
the optimal option. The trade-offs between different effects of separation deserve careful 
attention as changing the institutional structure causes several costs.  
 
Our analysis is of a highly qualitative nature as empirical data on effects of separation are very 
scarce. Instead of a quantitative analysis, our research is mainly based on desk research of 
economic literature on unbundling in network industries in general and studies directed at the 
Dutch case in particular. In addition, we have used discussions with several participants in the 
Dutch debate to collect information and check tentative findings.  
 
The focus of the analysis is on national welfare effects, meaning that we have looked for the net 
effect of unbundling on costs and benefits in the Dutch economy. Distributional effects, 
however, will also be mentioned as far as it is possible. Given the focus on welfare effects, this 
analysis does not include other aspects relevant for the decision on unbundling, such as legal 
aspects and political aspects. Moreover, although the debate holds for both electricity and 
natural gas networks, here we focus on the electricity industry. 
  
Theoretically-based insights on effects of vertical separation are given in chapter 2. This chapter 
starts by sketching the fundamental characteristics of network industries and their consequences 
for policy. It will appear that introduction of competition in contestable segments of network 
industries such as energy and telecommunications, requires regulation of access of producers 
and traders to that part of the industry that has a natural monopoly, i.e. the network. Unbundling 
is a means to improve allocative and technical efficiency in these industries, but also gives rise 
to several costs. In this chapter, we also give an overview of some international experiences 
with the introduction of competition in the electricity industry.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the four options for unbundling in more detail. In addition, this chapter 
presents the framework for analysing the costs and benefits of unbundling. The analysis of the 
several benefits is the subject of chapter 4, while chapter 5 deals with the costs. The overall 
assessment of all costs and benefits is given in chapter 6. Chapter 7 ends this document by 
summarising the main findings and giving some concluding remarks. 
   19 
2  Liberalisation, regulation and restructuring of the 
electricity industry 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter offers a general introduction of issues coming to fore when introducing 
competition in the electricity industry. Section 2.2 concisely describes the fundamental 
characteristics of the electricity industry as a network industry and the consequences for 
competition, regulation and industry structure. This section, which also describes several 
options to unbundle vertically integrated network firms, ends with the rationale behind splitting 
integrated utilities, paying attention to the debate on separation in other network industries, such 
as telecommunication and railways. Section 2.3 explores international experiences with 
introducing competition in the electricity industry, looking both outside and inside the European 
Union. Section 2.4 presents the concluding remarks.  
2.2  Competition in network industries 
2.2.1  Characteristics of network industries and liberalisation 
Network industries, such as energy, communications and railways, have three fundamental, 
mutually-related characteristics which make them different from other sectors (CPB, 2004). 
These characteristics are a) the presence of network infrastructures b) which form essential 
links in the related chain of activities and c) which coincide with substantial economies of scale. 
Below, we concisely elaborate on each of these characteristics. 
 
·  Presence of network infrastructure 
A consequence of the presence of network infrastructure, such as pipelines in the gas industry 
and tracks in railways, is the existence of network externalities. From the perspective of 
consumers, network externalities occur if “one person’s utility for a good depends on the 
number of other people who consume this good” (Varian, 2003). This holds in particular for the 
communications industry where each new consumer raises the value of the system to consumers 
already present. These network externalities follow directly from individual behaviour. Indirect 
network externalities result from increasing returns to scale in production: “a greater number of 
complementary products can be supplied - and at a lower price - when the network grows.” 
(Tirole, 1988). The more developed a network is, the cheaper extending the network generally 
is. In a well-developed railway system for instance, or an electricity grid or natural gas network, 
extending the system to more locations within the same area gives rise to relatively low costs 
due to the small distances which have to be covered. The existence of network externalities 
leads to two potential inefficiencies: excess inertia, i.e. users waiting to adopt a new technology, 
and excess momentum, i.e. consumers rush to an inferior technology (Tirole, 1988).    20 
·  Essential facility 
The network infrastructure forms an essential facility in the industry meaning that the 
infrastructure is a necessary input for the production of sectors using the infrastructure. Train 
operators absolutely need tracks to offer their transport services, just as electricity producers 
need wires to transport power. Strongly related to this is the high level of interdependence 
between users of the infrastructure. Consequently, the use of the infrastructure requires much 
coordination in order to prevent accidents or black outs. Moreover, the close links between 
infrastructure activities and operational activities could cause economies of scope, i.e. 
integrating these activities in one firm could be more efficient than conducting these activities 
in separate firms. 
·  Economies of scale 
Network industries exhibit significant economies of scale due to the high level of fixed costs. If 
investment in a network infrastructure has been made, this cost is mainly sunk. The huge fixed 
cost and the scale effects related to it make it uneconomical to double networks in most 
countries. As a consequence, networks are often natural monopolies. 
 
For example, in the electricity sector, natural monopolies exist on both the national level and 
the regional level. On the national level, electricity is transported by a high-voltage grid called 
the transmission network. On the regional level, low-voltage grids constitute distribution 
networks. The transmission network plays a crucial role in coordinating generation in order to 
achieve equilibrium between supply and demand at the most efficient way at every moment of 
time. It transports electricity over large distances, from a relatively small number of central 
generators to a few large customers and to regional distribution networks, which further 
transport it to smaller customers. Distribution networks are less important for realising system 
stability but are essential in delivering electricity to end-users. The distinction between national 
and regional grids is also relevant for the natural gas sector. On the national level, natural gas is 
transported by the high-pressure grid and on the regional level by low-pressure grids. 
 
Due to these fundamental characteristics of network industries, introduction of competition 
requires policy measures in several domains (see table 2.1). These domains include 
restructuring, design and opening of markets, regulation and ownership measures.
12 Below, we 
deal with some regulatory and restructuring measures. Because of the wide range and 
complexity of these measures, these sections are necessarily very concise. The main purpose of 
paying attention to the whole spectrum of competition measures is clarifying the role of 
unbundling as one structural measure amidst many other measures directed at introducing 
competition in a network industry. 
 
12 Joskow (2003a) mentions also horizontal integration of transmission and network operation as a key component for 
creating competitive markets.   21 
Table 2.1  Main domains of electricity reforms 
Category  Description 
   
Restructuring  Vertical unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
activities 
  Horizontal splitting of generation and supply 
Competition and markets  Wholesale markets and retail competition 
  Allowing new entry intro generation and supply 
Regulation  Establishing an independent regulator 
  Provision of third-party network access 
  Incentive regulation of transmission and distribution networks 
Ownership  Allowing new private actors 
  Privatising the existing publicly owned business 
   
Source: Jamasb et al., 2005.   
 
2.2.2  Liberalisation and regulation 
From the characteristics of network industries follow several potential market failures. The 
most important of these market failures is the existence of market power. Market power 
following from the characteristics of the infrastructure enables an unregulated network firm to 
demand monopoly prices, i.e. prices which maximise its profits. Such prices generate allocative 
inefficiencies as these prices exceed marginal costs. In case of a vertically integrated firm, this 
firm could use the market power resulting from the infrastructure to acquire market power in 
the downstream market and, consequently, also demand monopoly prices in this market. 
 
Network firms can be prevented from using their market power following from the network 
characteristics by public management or regulation. The former solution, which was the 
common choice in many countries in the past, enables state-owned firms to set prices at 
marginal-cost levels if the government gives lump-sum subsidies to cover the fixed costs. 
Although this option theoretically solves the issue of allocative efficiency, it generally scores 
lower on the issue of technical efficiency because of the lack of incentives for management to 
improve productivity. The latter solution mentioned above, regulation, enables private parties to 
operate the network firm and consequently improve technical efficiency. If, however, these 
firms should operate without government subsidy, regulated prices should be set at the average-
cost level. In that case, network firms are able to cover all their costs, although their production 
will be below the efficient level which is an allocative inefficiency. If access prices were set at a 
level below the average costs, the network firm does not have an incentive to invest in the 
infrastructure. The determination of the access tariffs belongs, therefore, to the key issues of 
regulating network industries. 
 
If the network firm is integrated with a downstream firm, regulation is also needed to guarantee 
access of other downstream firms to the infrastructure. As both parts of the vertically integrated 
firm usually are closely interwoven and the firm has strong incentives to hinder downstream   22 
competitors, regulators usually face magnificent difficulties to guarantee a level playing field 
for the latter. This problem can be solved by unbundling both parts of the vertically integrated 
firm. After all, proper third-party access to networks can only be realised if network activities 
are conducted independently from competitive activities.  
 
Regulation of networks also has to deal with the hold-up problem as investments in 
infrastructure are characterised by asset specificity and sunk costs. Ex ante, i.e. before any 
investment in networks has been made, both retailers and users fully depend on the network 
firm’s decision whether or not to invest in the essential facility. Ex post, i.e. when the 
investment in the network infrastructure has been made, the network firm fully depends on 
operators and retailers, as well as on the regulator, who may have an ex-post incentive to set a 
low access price.
13 The existence of this potential hold-up problem has been an incentive for 
vertical integration of both activities into one firm. After all, the hold-up problem does then not 
exist as all effects could be internalised. In a case of vertically separated firms, proper 
regulation of access fees for the infrastructure is needed to give the network firm adequate 
investment incentives. 
 
Summarising, regulation (in the broad sense) has to ensure that the network operators do not 
abuse market power resulting from the natural monopoly of the network. Key issues in the 
regulation of networks are the accessibility to the network of upstream or downstream 
commercial firms, the tariffs network firms may demand for the use of the network and the 
investment by network owners in maintaining and extending the network.  
2.2.3  Regulation and restructuring 
In order to achieve proper results on the above-mentioned issues of accessibility, network tariffs 
and investments, two types of measures can be used: structural measures and behavioural 
measures. The former affect the legal and ownership structure of the industry, while the latter 
focuses at changing the incentives of players in the industry. Behavioural measures include 
access regulation (notably negotiated or regulated third-party access), price regulation (e.g. 
price caps) and quality regulation.  
 
As unbundling can be established in different degrees, the question is which form is the most 




13 The importance of the hold-up problem in these industries follows from the sunk character of investments in infrastructure. 
Otherwise, the investor would not fully depend on the users of the infrastructure, as he could also recover his costs by 
selling the infrastructure to somebody else. This is why the hold-up problem does not emerge in other economic 
transactions, such as the sale of goods in a shop.   23 
·  Accounting unbundling: unbundling of accounts and cash flows; 
·  Organisational unbundling: split into different departments with separated management, 
accounts and cash flows within the same company; 
·  Legal unbundling: split into different legal entities (companies) belonging to the same owners; 




The degree of unbundling determines the need for behavioural measures. For instance, in the 
three forms of legal unbundling considered in this report, incentives for strategic behaviour on 
the holding level remain, therefore, additional behavioural measures by the regulator are 
necessary. The analysis of each form of vertical unbundling, therefore, will include the trade-
offs between structural measures and behavioural measures. 
 
Unbundling issues play an important role in restructuring many network industries. Such 
industries often have both competitive and non-competitive segments, as shown in table 2.2.  
Table 2.2  Competitive and non-competitive segments in network industries 
Industry  Activity which is usually non-
competitive 
Activities which are 
potentially competitive 
     
Electricity  High-voltage transmission 
and local electricity 
distribution 
Electricity generation and 
supply 
Gas  High-pressure transmission 
of gas 
Gas production, supply, 
storage 
Water  Distribution of water and 
wastewater 
Water collection and 
treatment 
Railways  Track and signalling 
infrastructure 
Operation of trains and 
maintenance facilities 
Telecommunications  Local residential telephony 
or local loop 
Long-distance telephony, 
mobile telecommunications, 
and value added services 
Air services  Airport services   Aircraft operations, 
maintenance facilities, and 
catering services 
     
Source OECD, ECO/WKP(2000)24.     
 
Deregulating the industry and introduction of competition in the competitive segment can 
deliver large welfare gains in many cases. This implies the need for the introduction of some 
form of unbundling. The choice of the degree of unbundling, however, is not the same across 
industries and may also depend on characteristics of the country. “As experience mounts with 
 
14 While the companies cannot belong to the same mother company they still can have the same ultimate owners. For 
example, a local authority can hold shares of both an electricity distribution company and the respective incumbent supply 
company from the same region.   24 
weaker forms of separation, a movement can be discerned, especially in certain sectors, towards 
stronger and more effective forms of separation.” (OECD, 2001.) 
In the railway industry, net welfare effects of vertical separation are highly debated (see e.g. 
OECD, 2004). Vertical separation would only generate a positive net benefit if it has a strong 
impact on competition. If competition is hardly possible - due to, for instance, a low traffic 
density - the benefits of vertical separation are negligible. Costs of this policy option, however, 
appear to be significant (see e.g. BTRE, 2003). Separation likely gives rise to significant costs 
due to loss of economies of density (fewer travellers per operator) and increased coordination 
costs (the complexity of interaction between the infrastructure manager and train operators 
increases disproportionately). Moreover, costs of utilisation of infrastructure capacity rise if 
new operators use trains with different characteristics - speeds, lengths, axle loads, etc., making 
it difficult to use the infrastructure intensively. In addition, in the case of separation, incentives 
to invest in rail infrastructure depend on the tariffs the manager may charge to operators, 
creating the risk of suboptimal investments. On the other side, investment of operators - in e.g. 
longer trains - depends on investments of infrastructure owners - in e.g. longer platforms. This 
mutual dependency may hamper investments. Finally, separation in railways may lead to 
inadequate incentives for the wheel-rail interface, negatively affecting investments in reliability 
as this strongly depends on this interface. 
 
Similarly to railways, in telecommunication separation of the local loop from competitive 
services appears problematic, because it undermines incentives for efficient investment in the 
local loop, as it is difficult to contractually arrange that the owner of local loop appropriates 
returns on his investment. Because of the alleged high economies of scope between network 
management and retail, local loop unbundling is usually carried out in a form of access 
regulation, such that the incumbent retains ownership and responsibility for maintenance of the 
lines which are then leased to the rival operator. In a cost-benefit analysis of structural 
separation in telecommunication, OECD (2003) concludes that structural separation in this 
industry is “risky with benefits that seem limited, uncertain, indeed, conjectural, with on the 
other hand, potentially significant costs including potentially adverse effects on network 
development. Certainly, there is insufficient evidence that benefits would be convincingly in 
excess of costs”. In other words, the OECD (2003) strongly doubts whether ownership 
unbundling in telecommunication would strengthen competition and, hence, reduce prices, 
while it views the costs of full separation significantly high, in particular due to increased 
problems with coordination of investments between network firm and retail firms. Given the 
growing competition among alternative techniques for telecommunication, i.e. copper lines, 
cable and wireless techniques, the networks in this industry cease to be bottlenecks, reducing 
the need for unbundling (De Bijl, 2004). 
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Although for both railways and telecommunications full separation of network and (potentially) 
commercial parts is doubtful from an economic perspective, the reasons leading to this 
conclusion are different. In railways, costs of separation seem to be significant due to close 
relationships between network management and operation. In telecommunication, these costs 
are not negligible either; but in addition to that, technological developments are reducing the 
essential-facility character of the networks. These different stories illustrate that industries 
should be considered separately in order to determine the likely effects of separation. Each 
sector has its own specific characteristics affecting the appropriate design of industry structure 
and markets.  
 
The electricity industry has a number of physical and economic attributes complicating 
transformation of the vertically integrated power industry into competition-based markets. 
Joskow (2003a) mentions the following key characteristics of the electricity industry: 
 
·  As electricity cannot be stored economically, production must meet demand at each moment of 
time; 
·  Economic management of use of network by producers and consumers is highly challenged by 
physical laws governing flows of electrons, and voltage and stability of the network; 
·  Given the above characteristics and the low short-run elasticity of demand, spot electricity 
prices are very volatile creating opportunities for suppliers to exercise market power; 
·  Congestion of networks may seriously hinder competition; 
·  The non-storability of electricity added to the large variety of demand between day and night, 
between weekdays and weekends, between seasons and due to weather conditions, results in a 
significant share of total generation capacity which is hardly used during the year. In a 
liberalised environment, investments in this peak capacity strongly depend on prices during 
peak hours. 
·  The regulation of the transmission network, in terms of access tariffs and allocation of scarce 
capacity, determines the possible outcomes of the competitive markets for generation and 
supply.  
 
Because of these specific characteristics, the electricity industry consisted of vertically 
integrated utilities in the past. According to Joskow (2003a), “replacing these hierarchical 
governance arrangements with well functioning decentralised market mechanisms is a very 
significant technical challenge, about which even the best experts have disagreements”. The key 
challenge in electricity liberalisation is dealing with the tension between the desire for efficient 
markets on the one hand and for long-term investment on the other (Newbery, 2002b). In 
decentralised competitive electricity markets, investments in (peak) generation plants are very 
risky due to highly uncertain prices during periods of peak demand, possibly leading to 
inefficient levels of investments. In less competitive (oligopoly or monopoly) markets, control   26 
over prices reduces this uncertainty but results in allocative inefficiencies and also in inefficient 
levels of investment. As a result, the most appropriate structure of the electricity industry is still 
an inconclusive issue, also because models which work well in some circumstances perform 
less in other places. (Newbery, 2002a.) 
 
On some issues, however, theoretical and empirical evidence is quite straightforward. Practice 
shows that ownership unbundling works well for separation of the transmission system 
operation from competitive activities. The net benefits of ownership unbundling in this part of 
the electricity industry are widely acknowledged (see e.g. Joskow, 2003a, and Jamasb et al., 
2005). In the distribution industry, we observe examples of both enforced and voluntary 
ownership unbundling from competitive activities in their service areas (i.e. in New Zealand 
and in the United Kingdom, respectively). However, the latter examples of ownership 
unbundling are quite unique. The last EU Directive on electricity requires only legal 
unbundling, as was mentioned in chapter 1. In the next section we will go deeper into 
international experiences with reforms in the electricity industry. 
2.3  International experiences in the electricity industry 
2.3.1  Introduction 
In this section, we review some international experiences with unbundling energy distribution 
from commercial activities. While not aiming to provide a full review of international 
experiences, we include the few relevant experiences that we have been able to find that 
highlight the role of unbundling in market reforms. First, we look at developments outside 
Europe, in particular at those countries heading the world-wide process on introduction of 
competition in the electricity industry. Next, we sketch experiences of members of the 
European Union with this process of structural change in this industry. The final section 
analyses the main lessons of the experiences from abroad for the Dutch case. 
2.3.2  Outside Europe 
The United States and several countries at the Southern Hemisphere, i.e. New Zealand, 
Argentina and Chile, have introduced competition and related structural changes in the 
electricity industry in the past decades. Below, we mention the main measures taken and their 
impact in each of these countries. 
United States 
Unlike the situation in European countries, electricity reforms and privatisation in the United 
States have occurred at both the national level and the state level. An implication has been that 
there was a different degree of restructuring observed across the states, which allowed some 
states to go much further with their reforms than others. However, a different focus of national   27 
and local regulation offices and conflicting policies have in some cases contributed to creating a 
crisis situation. The well-known example of this inconsistency of regulation is California’s 
electricity crisis , in which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) promoted 
competitive pricing at the wholesale market, while the state government of California was 
maintaining price caps for final consumers. 
 
In his assessment of experiences with introducing competition in electricity markets in the 
United States, Joskow (2003a) concludes that this process “has encountered more problems and 
proceeded less quickly than some had anticipated when the first restructuring and competition 
programs were first being implemented in the late 1990s”. The author mentions the following 
problems: 
 
·  The boom in investment in generation capacity, caused by a financial bubble giving access to 
cheap capital, and the growth in wholesale power trade turned into a bust resulting in many 
electricity firms being in financial trouble. 
·  Liquidity and, hence, the efficiency of the market has fallen dramatically due to withdrawal of 
trading companies. Efficiency of wholesale power markets has been reduced because of market 
power problems and other market imperfections. 
·  The performance of competition on the retail market has been disappointing. In California, for 
instance, retail prices increased by 30 to 40% due to market design imperfections, market power 
problems and poor responses of federal and state authorities. 
·  The capacity of the transmission grid has hardly been extended in spite of a congested network, 
which caused several local market power problems. This bad performance of the network part is 
likely due to the institutional structure in which, contrary to many other countries, a large part 
of the transmission network is still owned and operated by vertically integrated companies. 
 
The introduction of competition in electricity markets in the United States has also produced 
successes. Joskow (2003a) mentions the following achievements: 
 
·  Substantial investments in new generating plants by merchant generating companies; 
·  A shift of responsibility of construction costs, operating performance and market risks from 
consumers (under regulation) to suppliers; 
·  A substantial growth in the magnitude of electricity supplied through competitive wholesale 
markets; 
·  Lower electricity prices for the largest customers. 
 
Because of the disappointing results of electricity restructuring in states in the Northeast, 
California and some others, several other states “have either taken a cautious wait and see 
attitude or have simply rejected restructuring and competition initiatives. These states tend to   28 
have relatively low regulated retail prices, do not face looming supply shortages or reliability 
problems and face little consumer pressure for change. Why take the risk that a California-like 
crisis will come home to roost?” (Joskow, 2003a). The states that were at the forefront of 
electricity restructuring, however, have proceeded in order to overcome the above problems by 
improving the design of markets and regulation. These actions include measures directed at 
increasing investments in transmission capacity and reducing market power by encouraging 
divesture of transmission assets by the vertically integrated firms in order to form independent 
transmission companies.  
 
Generally, the actions to be taken in order to improve performance of liberalised electricity 
markets follow from lessons produced by events such as the California experiences. One of 
those lessons is, according to Newbery (2002a), that risks following from unbundling 
generation from supply require long-term contracts or hedging instruments to insure against 
dramatic chances in spot prices. 
 
Argentina and Chile 
Among developing countries, only Argentina and Chile had successful comprehensive reforms 
of their electricity industries. The reforms had a number of features that are similar to those in 
reforms in Europe, such as restructuring (some degree of disintegration), introduction of 
competition in competitive segments and regulation of network charges. Also privatisation 
played a large role in improving efficiency in the electricity sectors of Argentina and Chile. 
 
Although the reforms have generally led to positive changes in the electricity sectors of these 
two countries, there were still several drawbacks that slugged the development. We refer the 
readers to Pollitt (2004ab) for the general discussion of the lessons from the reforms in Chile 
and Argentine, mentioning here only those experiences that are relevant in the context of our 
report.  
 
In particular, one of the problems mentioned in Pollitt (2004a) for Chile is little competition 
between the generators for customers embedded in the distribution networks, because of too 
much vertical integration of incumbents. This effect arises because in Chile there is no 
regulation of the combined network and retail charges of distribution companies. Incumbent 
distribution companies integrated with generators offer very low prices to large users, 
preventing both physical and financial bypass by competing generators who are denied a 
contract market. Pollitt concludes:  
“In general generators should be allowed to merge with retailers but not with retailers and 
distribution wire businesses as this potentially creates the same access problems as arise when 
generation and transmission are merged.” (Pollitt, 2004a, p.15.)  
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In contrast, this particular problem did not occur in Argentina, where distribution and 
generation were unbundled and there was no incentive for distribution companies to prevent 
efficient financial bypass. (Pollitt, 2004b, p.18.) 
New Zealand 
In New Zealand, separation of network activities from retail and generation was followed by an 
increase in competition. The Electricity Industry Reform Act of 1998 mandated that the 
network businesses should be owned separately from retail and generation businesses. 
According to the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development:
15 “The rationale behind 
separation of competitive retailing from natural monopoly lines is that integrated electricity 
supply companies have incentives and the ability to restrict a competitor's use of their lines, 
cross subsidise between distribution, retail and any generation business; and charge monopoly 
prices in distribution and retail markets.”  
 
Electricity companies complied with the separation requirement faster than the Act required, 
completing the ownership separation by April 1, 1999. In most cases the formerly integrated 
electricity companies retained network activities and sold their retail businesses. Currently there 
are about 10 retailers, 31 distribution businesses and one state-owned TSO, Transpower. 
 
Competition in electricity retail was very limited prior to separation and much improved after 
that. Many customers switched provider in response to market signals. However, not only 
ownership separation contributed to this improvement. Prior to separation, in order to switch to 
a new entrant, customers had to install a time-of-use meter, unless the incumbent and the 
entrant agreed otherwise. Since the meters are costly, this was only reasonable for large users. 
On April 1, 1999, new arrangements were introduced, such as load profiling, to ensure that 
small customers could also switch supplier. Also the national generation company ECNZ that 
used to dominate the market was split into three state-owned generators on 1 April 1999.  
 
The measures implemented in New Zealand, i.e. ownership unbundling, improved switching 
possibilities and splitting of the incumbent led to a decrease in wholesale prices. While during 
the one-year period before April 1, 1999, wholesale price averaged 3.74 c/kWh, in the next year 
it fell to 2.64 c/kWh. However, as the three measures were undertaken at the same time, the 
positive effect on market functioning should not be ascribed to ownership unbundling alone. 
Also, we observe that currently the government of New Zealand allows some generation to be 
owned by line businesses. 
 
 
15 Source: http://www.med.govt.nz/ers/electric/sector/sector-02.html.   30 
On the other hand, the example of New Zealand, where companies complied with ownership 
unbundling (as introduced by the Electricity Act in New Zealand in 1998) within a year, shows 
that the transaction cost of introducing this form of unbundling is unlikely to be too large.  
2.3.3  European Union 
Within the European Union, the United Kingdom has been at the forefront in liberalising 
markets, including the electricity market. This country features some examples of voluntary 
unbundling of energy companies. Also the experience of Denmark is interesting, because it is 
one of few countries that have a restriction regarding ownership shares of generators in network 
companies. Finally we include an example of Germany, a country which features relatively high 
vertical integration.  
United Kingdom 
Within Europe, the United Kingdom was the first country completely liberalising the electricity 
market. During the restructuring processes, a trade-off was made between vertical and 
horizontal concentration. The major generators (Powergen and National Power) were not 
allowed to vertically integrate unless they divested themselves of some generation assets. For 
example, the government approved the merger of Powergen with a regional distribution 
company, East Midlands Electricity, in return for further divestiture of generating plant by 
Powergen. (Pollitt, 1999.)  
 
Since 2000, the UK applies separate licensing of distribution companies (i.e. legal unbundling). 
There are 12 distribution companies in England and 2 in Scotland. Although no ownership 
unbundling of network from other businesses was required by law, it happened voluntarily in 
several cases. Currently, a half of (formerly) integrated incumbent companies feature different 
ownership of the network and supply. Van Damme et al. (2004) provide information regarding 
the ownership structure, which we present in Table 2.3 below. We observe that there are five 
main parties that are active in supply: E.On, EdF, RWE, Scottish and Southern Energy and 
Scottish Power. Apart from RWE, each of these large utilities also operates some regional 
network in the UK. There is one large entrant into the UK residential electricity market without 
wires - British Gas, i.e. the dominant incumbent supplier of gas to the same customers. This 
company is the most successful entrant. According to the estimates by Waddams and Prandini, 
the share of the other entrants in the UK residential market remains very low (about 1%)
16, 
which confirms that it may be difficult to entry such a market.  
 
The increase in competition has led to improved efficiency and lower end-user prices, 
especially for larger customers. For residential customers, however, the effect of competition on 
 
16 Waddams and Prandiny ‘Vertical separation and competition in energy markets’, presentation at the CIEP Energy Market 
Seminar, February 9, 2005, The Hague.   31 
prices is far less clear. (See Giulietti et al, 2006.) This seems to be consistent with the 
development observed in other countries. For example, Steiner (2000) reports that the reforms 
generally induced a decline in the industrial price and an increase in the price-differential 
between industrial customers and residential customers. Hence, industrial customers generally 
benefit from the reforms in the electricity industry. 
Table 2.3  The ownership of distribution and supply in the United Kingdom 
  Supply  Network 
Same owners of supply and retail     
East Midlands Electricity  E.On   
London Electricity  EdF   
Manweb  EdF   
Scottish Power  Scottish Power   
Scottish Hydro Electric  Scottish and Southern Power   
Seeboard  EdF   
Southern Electric  Scottish and Southern Power   
     
Different owners of supply and retail     
Eastern Electricity   E.On  EdF 
Midlands Electricity  RWE  Aquila/First Energy 
Northern Electric  RWE  Mid American Holding Company 
Norweb  E.On  United Utilities 
South Wales Electricity  Scottish and Southern Power  PPL 
South Western Electricity  EdF  PPL 
Yorkshire Electricity  RWE  Mid American Holding Company 
 
Source: Van Damme et al. (2004) 
 
Also the British gas industry has an impressive example of a voluntary split of a formerly 
integrated energy company, the British Gas, into three companies - Centrica (supply), Transco
17 
(network), and British Gas (production).We see two reasons for this voluntary split, which took 
place several years after the debate on vertical organisation in the United Kingdom had started. 
·  The old structure did not quite fit into the new market environment. By 1993, there were 
already several inquiries (by the Competition Commission) into the gas market, and it was 
recognised more and more clearly that strict legal unbundling and strict regulatory power do not 
make competition work under joint ownership.  
·  The second reason is internal: different goals and a lack of synergy among the three companies 
hindered efficient operations. The structure was not sufficiently transparent. There was a lack of 
synergy, while it was costly to facilitate independent operation, which made it difficult and 
costly to manage such an integrated company.  
 
17 The National Grid Transco is currently about to sell four of their distribution business, which has been conditionally 
approved by Ofgem. See the website of Ofgem. 
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By providing the experience of several examples of voluntary unbundling, the British energy 
industry gives us some information about the magnitude of the economies of scope after the 
introduction of competition in the energy market. Although ownership unbundling of the 
network and the incumbent suppliers was not imposed by law, it happened in many cases 
voluntary, implying that the remaining operational synergies after legal unbundling are unlikely 
to be too large. For example, in the case of ownership separation of British Gas, major costs of 
the separation of supply from the network lied in changing information systems; and two years 
were sufficient to get the companies on the right track. The shareholder value for all three 
companies increased as well as the size of operation of Centrica (supply) did. Unbundling also 
improved the relations between the company and the regulator. 
Concluding, let us compare the situation in the electricity industry in the United Kingdom to 
that in the Netherlands. We notice that the number of large players in the United Kingdom is 
larger than in the Netherlands, where the market is dominated by three large players, two of 
which also control a large share of central generation (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). Having too 
few suppliers may be a potentially large problem in the residential market, as price 
transparency, needed to enable residential consumers to choose between suppliers, may lead to 
joint dominance by these suppliers in the market. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the 
effect of the unbundling decision on the number of suppliers. Furthermore, the experience of the 
United Kingdom suggests that reducing market share of market players (by means of vertical or 
horizontal ownership unbundling) may be beneficial for market functioning. 
Denmark 
In Denmark, the number of suppliers has increased after the introduction of liberalisation in 
January 2003. There are now about 40 obligation-to-supply companies, which are the former 
regional distribution companies, and about 25 suppliers who can access network (under 
regulated TPA) and freely compete in the market. The latter are called trading companies. 
According to the law, supply and network companies should be organised as separate legal 
entities but can belong to the same group (common ownership), which is often the case. In 
particular, the obligation-to-supply companies are often owned by network companies, and 
organised as their subsidiaries. Also some of the free trading companies belong to groups. 
However, there is a restriction that not more than 15% of network assets can be in hands of 
supply companies and/or producers (as reported by van Damme and Kanning (2004) with a 
reference to Deloitte en Touche
18).  
 
When customers choose another supplier than their original licensed supply company, the 
network company is responsible for the transfer of such customers to the new supplier (in 
particular for the necessary exchange of information between the old and the new supplier). The 
 
18 ‘Internationale benchmark privatisering en unbundling regionale energiebedrijven’, July 23, 2003.   33 
law prohibits the distributor to give a preferential treatment of its affiliated supply company: all 
transactions must be on market conditions, be based on written agreements, etc. Still, in 
practice, some distributors seem to be very slow in allowing external sales companies, referring 
for example to computer system difficulties.  
 
In Denmark, prices charged by the incumbent obligation-to-supply companies (who used to 
supply to captive customers before liberalisation) are still regulated in order to protect 
customers in their areas who are non-active in the market. Since retail prices in Denmark are 
partly regulated, it is difficult to use the example of Denmark to see how much benefits of 
increased competition may be achieved. 
Germany 
Germany is one of the European countries seriously lagging behind in implementing steps 
needed to obtain effective competition in the electricity industry. The German energy market is 
dominated by four vertically integrated private energy companies: RWE, E.ON, EnBW and 
Vattenfall, which also own transmission networks. Also tens of little regional supply companies 
in Germany are vertically integrated with regional networks. Only since recent, distribution 
companies have been obliged to have accounting unbundling, but it is still not fully 
implemented (Energie Nederland, May 2004). Of all EU-15 countries, only Germany, Finland 
and Portugal have still only accounting unbundling in distribution (EC, 2005). Only recently 
Germany's parliament passed a new law that is meant to increase competition within the 
country's energy market. Since electricity networks tariffs were not regulated in Germany, 
German network charges exceed network charges in other EU countries. (EC, 2005, p.11.) 
 
Large Dutch energy concerns, such as Nuon and Essent, own several regional energy 
companies in Germany, including the respective distribution networks. Also large German 
energy companies own energy businesses in other countries (e.g., E.ON owns a generator in the 
Netherlands). 
2.4  Concluding remarks 
Unbundling of networks from potentially competitive parts of network industries encourages 
competition in the latter. As several options exist to unbundle this industry, from accounting to 
ownership unbundling, the appropriate option depends on the costs and benefits from an 
economic point of view. Evidence from other network industries, i.e. railways and 
telecommunications, suggests that ownership unbundling can raise significant costs, in 
particular due to loss of economies of scope, while the impact on competition can be modest. 
However, its application for energy is limited as each industry has its unique features. 
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International experiences with restructuring the electricity industry do not produce clear 
answers on the impact of unbundling. With respect to negative sides of insufficient unbundling, 
we can mention entry barriers due to the superior position of incumbents. It is difficult to 
monitor that the superior information position of networks is not misused (e.g. it is impossible 
to prove if delays of sending bill information or slow customer transfer to entrants are indeed 
due to ICT problems). Furthermore, there is evidence that high degree of vertical integration 
may amplify problems of high degree of horizontal integration, as well as evidence that the 
integration of generation supply and distribution in the absence of efficient third party tariffs 
discourages new entry in generation (Chile).  
 
While there is international evidence that more competition in the market leads to lower price 
margins and hence to lower prices, and that a lower degree of both vertical and horizontal 
integration contributes to better market conditions, there is hardly evidence that would allow us 
to quantify this contribution. In most cases, when competition improved after introducing (a 
stronger form of) unbundling, the events were accompanied by other regulatory changes. The 
fact that we observe some examples of voluntary unbundling suggests that costs of such an 
operation need not to be high in comparison to the benefits. 
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3  Cost-benefit analysis of several options for unbundling 
3.1  Introduction 
The fundamental characteristics of network industries as well as the reasons behind 
restructuring the industry, both described in the former chapter, form the basis for assessing 
several options for unbundling. In this chapter, we describe the framework for analysing costs 
and benefits of such a measure changing the structure of an industry. This chapter consists of 
two sections. Section 3.2 describes several options for unbundling, while section 3.3 depicts an 
overview of all cost and benefit categories which will be used in our assessment. 
3.2  Options for unbundling 
3.2.1  Four options 
In chapter 1, we have introduced four options to restructure the energy distribution sector in the 
Netherlands. These options are: 
 
·  Legal-Lean: the currently present structure of legal unbundling with lean network managers; 
·  Legal-Fat: a structure of legal unbundling with fat network managers without financing 
capabilities; 
·  Legal-Fat Plus: a structure with fat network managers being financially independent; 
·  Ownership: ownership unbundling resulting in fully independent network firms.
19 
 
The first option represents the current situation, the last one corresponds to the proposal of the 
Minister, and the other two are intermediate options between them.  
 
3.2.2  Legal-Lean 
Currently, the energy distribution firms in the Netherlands are legally unbundled. However, the 
network firms belong to groups (‘holdings’), which share their operational, managerial, and 
financial responsibilities. For example, some strategic and operational tasks of network 
companies are now done in collaboration with other parts of the holdings, or outsourced to them 
(e.g. shared service centres). Most network firms are lean, i.e. do not have economic ownership 
of their assets. They are organised as a BV
20 with no assets and only a few employees, while the 
network assets are typically owned and financed by the holdings. In the recent revision of the 
Electricity law 1998 (also referred to as the I&I-law) there is an article regarding shifting 
economic ownership to network companies, but this article has not come into force yet. 
 
19 In our definition of ownership unbundling, the network firm is able to integrate with other non-energy, commercial 
activities, giving rise to other sources of cross subsidies. A stronger form of ownership unbundling could, therefore, include 
limitation on integration with activities outside the energy industry. 
20 BV=’Besloten vennootschap’.   36 
Although the network firms do not possess the infrastructure assets, the regulator (DTe) 
assumes that these assets belong to the network firms, i.e. it assumes a so-called regulatory asset 
base. 
3.2.3  Legal-Fat  
In this option for structuring the industry, the network firms are still part of the groups. They are 
legally and operationally unbundled from commercial activities and have the economic 
ownership of the assets. As a result, no difference exists between the formal and actual 
treatment of the assets of network firms by the regulator, as is the case in the Legal-Lean 
structure.  
 
Operational unbundling means that all the strategic network activities are assigned to the 
network firm. The strategic activities affect competition in the energy market, hence, it is 
desirable that no market parties are involved in performing them.  
 
DTe (2004b) lists strategic functions:  
 
·  Investment decisions regarding the extension and maintenance of the network; 
·  Operational management (e.g., dispatch, negotiations on contracts over the access to the 
network, responsibility about information systems); 
·  Contracting of the parties that perform outsourced activities; 
·  Financial policy (setting up the annual reports, billing, contact with clients); 
·  Supervision of the design of new and maintained networks; 
·  Management of information systems. 
 
The three last functions were formally classified as operational functions (Electricity Act, 
1998), however, according to DTe, they should also belong to strategic functions. In such a 
case, only few operational functions could be contracted out to commercial firms, such as: 
 
·  Field work, i.e. physical constructions and maintenance of the grid; 
·  Inspection tasks for safety; 
·  R&D with respect to network techniques. 
 
To prevent cross-subsidisation in the case of contracting certain tasks among the companies 
within the same holding, the arms’ length principle should be applied. This means that 
companies should charge each other on the same basis as they would charge external 
companies. Given informational asymmetry existing between the firms and the regulator, it may 
however be challenging to control for the application of the arms’ length principle in this 
situation.    37 
3.2.4  Legal-Fat Plus 
The Legal-Fat Plus option is different from the previous options in that it strengthens the 
existing financial rules by giving the network more financial capabilities. 
 
In the previous options, financing issues are to a large extent dealt with at the level of the 
holding. There is no formal restriction preventing that cash flow of networks can be used by the 
holdings (e.g. it may flow out in the form of dividends or through transactions, especially with 
respect to the old financial contracts of the holdings where the network assets provide 
guaranties, such as cross-border leases which are still in place
21). Since commercial activities 
are generally more risky than network activities, this imposes the risks on the network 
companies that there may be insufficient cash flow to maintain the network or insufficient funds 
to finance network investment. In order to protect the networks from such problems, a further 
step is taken: the introduction of extra rules that would provide the networks with more 
financial independence. Such rules are called financial ring fencing. 
 
The term ring fencing can be defined as “a process undertaken to determine the total asset and 
resource base and liabilities and obligations of a particular functional unit and the revenue and 
operational costs associated with the unit as if it were to operate independently.” (See, e.g., 
PWC, 2004.) Any form of unbundling can also be seen as some form of a ring fence. A 
financial ring fence secures that the networks do not run into financial difficulties due to 
financial losses in other parts of holdings. This can be done by setting a threshold on the credit 
rating of the group, after which the regulator have to approve all financial transactions of the 
network company with other companies in the group to which it belongs. This secures the 
ability of the network company to get enough financing for its operation and investment and 
prevents creditors of the holding (or other subsidiaries) from having recourse on the assets of 
the network owner in case the company defaults on its debts.  
 
A comparable measure was recently proposed by the British regulator (Ofgem, 2004a,b). The 
box below summarises typical features of financial ring-fencing as discussed in the Ofgem 
proposal for independent gas transportation companies. In another document, for British 
electricity distribution network companies, Ofgem suggests a financial ring-fence of the 
networks in the case of ‘a trigger event’, i.e. an event that signals a deterioration of the financial 
strength of the parent company, for instance, a downgrade of its credit rating. Such an event 
activates a ‘cash lock up mechanism’. This means that an approval of the authority becomes 
necessary for certain transactions, such as paying dividends, certain transfers of money, 
payment of principal and interest on certain loans, fair value payments for goods, services and 
tax losses, and acquisitions of certain investments. Such a measure reduces the risk of 
underinvestment in network.  
 
21 There is an article in the I&I-law that prevents using network assets as a collateral for new contracts.    38 
Unfortunately, by itself, the group credit rating may not guarantee that each company in the 
holding, in particular the network company, has enough cash flow for operational needs. 
Therefore, the above measure can be complemented by some restriction on the cash-outflow 
(e.g. in the form of dividends or money transfers) from the network company.  
 
By implementing a financial ring fence, not all links between the network firm and commercial 
firms are cut through. The holdings still have certain shareholder powers, e.g., through personal 
links with the network firm. Although, the holdings’ formal shareholder powers are restricted 
(especially for larger network companies that are subject to the ‘structuurregime’), informal 
powers may still play a role, affecting the choice of the management board members.  
Financial ring-fencing arrangements 
According to Ofgem, there are two major advantages of financial ring-fencing arrangements of licensed energy network 
companies. They are the following: 
  
 ‘They  provide  protection  from  certain  events  that  might  otherwise  lead  to  the  insolvency  of  the  licensee,  thereby 
protecting consumers from the associated uncertainty and disruption.’  
‘They allow the licensee to retain access to financial markets on reasonable terms, thereby facilitating the funding of 
future investment programmes.’ 
 
Financial ring-fencing requires a licensee: 
 
♦’To procure an undertaking from its ultimate controller that it will refrain from taking any action which would be likely to 
cause the licensee to breach its obligations under the Gas/Electricity Act or its GT licence; 
♦ Not to incur any indebtedness nor create any security, nor guarantee any liability of another person, other than on 
certain specified terms and for a permitted purpose, or otherwise with consent of the Authority; 
♦ Not to conduct any business other than its core business, subject to certain exceptions and specific limitations on the 
turnover and investment of permitted non-core activities; 
♦ To ensure that the licensee has sufficient resources to carry on its licensed business and to submit a report to the 
Authority each year confirming availability of financial resources; 
♦ To maintain an investment grade credit rating; and  
♦ Not to enter into an agreement incorporating a cross-default obligation without consent of the Authority.’ 
 
Source: Ofgem, 12 November 2004, Financial ring-fencing for new and existing independent gas transporters. Initial proposals.  
Section 4. 
 
3.2.5  Ownership unbundling 
This policy option results in the strongest form of unbundling. It completely removes all 
financial and operational links between network firms and commercial firms, such as carrying 
the same name, combining commercial and network information in one mail to a customer, etc. 
In this option, networks are fully split from the original holdings, so that the holdings have no 
shareholders’ rights. For example, a holding (a current owner of a network company) cannot 
even informally affect the choice of the board members for the network company, financial   39 
decisions or decisions on network investment. Ownership separation means that there will be no 
common financing of the network and commercial activities. The old contracts of the holdings 
regarding financing, such as cross-border leases, may need to be broken or altered, in order to 
implement the full separation.  
 
Ownership unbundling can be implemented in several ways, as the Minister of Economic 
Affairs has pointed out in his letter to the House of Parliament
22:  
 
·  The network firm is directly owned by the shareholders; 
·  The network firm is owned by the current holding while the commercial activities are 
conducted in a newly established firm; 
·  The network firm is owned by a newly established holding while the commercial activities are 
conducted by the current holding. 
 
As the network firm is fully independent in all these cases, we can ignore the form the 
ownership unbundling has been organised in our analysis. What is important here is that the 
proposal does not allow for direct ownership of the network and commercial activities by the 
same group, while allowing for indirect ownership of the network and commercial activities by 
the same ultimate shareholders (cities and provinces in this case).  
3.3  Categories of costs and benefits 
In order to compare several options for structural separation, we use the welfare-economic 
approach. In this approach, the key question is whether a policy measure, i.e. an option for 
unbundling, affects allocative efficiency, technical efficiency or distribution of effects on 
efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to welfare effects of the allocation of goods and 
technical efficiency to the costs of supplying goods. If a good is not priced according marginal 
costs of supplying it, an allocative inefficiency exists. So, allocative efficiency is related to the 
way goods are priced and allocated. Technical efficiency is related to the incentives firms have 
to improve productivity, both in the short term (i.e. static efficiency) and in the longer term (i.e. 
dynamic efficiency). These efficiency concepts determine our cost-benefit analysis. In other 
words, we analyse whether unbundling affects the functioning of markets and the allocation of 
goods, the incentives for firms to improve productivity and raise quality of their products, and 
finally, the distribution of the results of production and allocation (i.e. welfare) among 
consumers and firms.  
 
 
22 The Minister of Economic Affairs, letter to the House of Parliament of October 11, 2004 (Kamerstukken II, 2003 – 2004, 
28982, nr.18).   40 
As unbundling potentially impacts many components of the industry, we have distinguished 
several categories of costs and benefits (see figure 3.1).
23  
 
Unbundling immediately affects independence of network management. Depending on the 
degree of unbundling, it raises transparency of costs and returns of the network firm and 
reduces incentives for cross subsidies and distorting actions, provided a proper allocation of 
tasks between network firm and commercial firms, and, furthermore, it increases financial 
security for the network firm. Moreover, unbundling of network firms may open options to 
realise economies of scale in network management. As a result, the performance of the network 
firm rises. Section 4.2 analyses this benefit.  
Figure 3.1  Benefits and costs of unbundling and structure of chapters 4 and 5 
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Unbundling also directly impacts effectiveness and efficiency of regulation. The increased 
transparency enables the regulator to set appropriately access tariffs and other incentives for the 
network firm. This also increases performance of networks. In addition, the increased 
transparency improves regulator’s ability to monitor the market. Due to the reduction in 
incentives for strategic behaviour, regulation becomes less complicated and, hence, more 
efficient. Section 4.3 is directed to the benefits on regulation. 
 
23 These categories are more or less comparable to those used in OECD (2003). In that report, the benefit categories 
include facilitation of competition, transparency about costs of the non-competitive activity, and innovation in the 
infrastructure. The cost categories in that study include loss of economies of scope, investments in relation-specific assets 
and one-off transaction costs.   41 
 
Both improved network performance and more effective regulation affect competition. The 
improved network performance leads to less allocative distortion caused by high network 
tariffs
24 as well as to better options for new entrants for dispatching to the grid or for supplying. 
Regulation directly affects competition by improved market surveillance. Competition is also 
directly affected by unbundling through the impact on cross subsidies and distorting actions by 
vertically integrated firms. Section 4.4 deals with all these effects on competition. 
 
A final, side-benefit of unbundling is related to its impact on privatisation of commercial 
activities. If public shareholders are enabled to sell their shares in these activities, several 
benefits follow. Firstly, privatisation enables public authorities withdraw public capital from 
commercial activities and to use the proceeds for financing other socially preferable 
investments. Secondly, unbundling and privatisation could raise the value of the commercial 
firms by reducing corporate inefficiencies, optimising the financial structure and increasing the 
pressure of private shareholders to increase efficiency. Section 4.5 is directed at these benefits. 
 
As there is no free lunch, unbundling also introduces costs. We distinguish transitional cost 
(section 5.2), loss of economies of scope (section 5.3) and a risk of reduced investment in 
generation (section 5.4). 
 
Transaction costs are costs which are directly related to the implementation of the measure to 
unbundle. This cost item mainly consists of costs of restructuring the industry, such as breaking 
existing links between network and commercial parts of the holding and changing (financial) 
contracts. Other transaction costs include costs of changing legislation by the public authorities.  
 
Loss of economies of scope is a potentially significant cost of unbundling as network and other 
parts of the chain (i.e. generation and retail) are closely related to each other, as is described in 
chapter 2. 
 
A final cost item which deserves specific attention is the risk of less investment in generation. 
Unbundling likely results in higher capital costs for the (currently) vertically integrated 
generation firms, as a result of which investments in new power plants by these firms could 
reduce. 
 
Combining the four options for unbundling and the above categories of benefits and costs, we 
are able construct a table with the list of benefits and costs as captions of the rows, and the four 
 
24 If network costs are not priced according to the marginal costs, allocative inefficiency exists. Pure marginal cost-pricing is 
a convenient theoretical idea, however, infeasible in practice due to fixed costs. However, other pricing structures based on 
this idea may be still feasible (e.g. two-part tariffs, with variable charges reflecting marginal cost).  
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policy options as captions of the columns (see table 6.1). In chapters 4 and 5, we look 
horizontally, focusing on each individual category of benefits and costs, and compare the 
relative performance for this category across the four policy options. In chapter 6, we look 
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4  Benefits of unbundling 
4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter we analyse the benefits of four options for unbundling using the categories 
described in chapter 3. Section 4.2 analyses the impact of unbundling on the performance of the 
network, section 4.3 focuses on effectiveness and efficiency of regulation, section 4.4 deals 
with the overall impact on competition, and section 4.5 goes into the benefits of privatisation 
after unbundling has been realised. 
 
4.2  Performance of networks 
4.2.1  Introduction 
Unbundling breaks links between the network company and commercial activities. The stronger 
the unbundling, the more links are broken. This provides more independence to the network, 
which affects performance of the network company itself, as well as performance in the other 
parts of the electricity supply chain. In this section we discuss the benefits for the network that 
arise from a more independent position of the network company. These benefits include less 
risk of underinvestment in the network, which stems from more secured financing and an 
improved focus of the network company on its own objectives. Hence, an independent network 
company better responds to regulatory incentives. Such a company is likely to operate more 
efficiently and to provide a better price-to-quality ratio. A second benefit is associated with the 
possibility to achieve economies of scale by merging networks. Before we discuss these two 
benefits (in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, respectively), let us first explain why in the current 
situation the network may be insufficiently independent. 
 
4.2.2  Current situation 
In the case of legal unbundling, independence of management is regulated but not fully realised. 
There are still personal links, as well as financial links between network and commercial 
activities. 
 
The Dutch Electricity Law 1998 makes certain provisions that are meant to secure independent 
decision making of network companies. In particular, Article 11(2) stipulates that network 
companies should necessarily establish a supervisory board. The management board of a 
network company as well as the majority of the supervisory board cannot be tied directly or 
indirectly with a producer, a supplier or a shareholder of the network company.    44 
The supervisory board has to approve a certain range of strategic decisions of the management 
board, while the shareholders should not interfere with the core network activities.
25 Still, 
especially if network companies are not subject to the ‘structuurregime’, the holdings (which 
are their shareholders) can appoint members of the network companies’ boards. If a network 
company is a ‘vennootschap met een verplicht structuurregime’ this power is limited. For 
example, the members of the supervisory board are appointed by cooptation. Still, the holdings 
(as a network company’s shareholder) may have informal ‘advisory’ powers.
26 Therefore, in 
both cases personal links exist between network firm and the holding. 
Although the independence of the decisions of network companies from their shareholders (the 
utility holdings) has been formally arranged already in the Electricity Law 1998, there has been 
some freedom left to the holdings to decide regarding how ‘fat’ to make their networks. Hence, 
holdings could choose for a lean structure for their network companies, as well as use the 
network assets as a collateral in financial contracts of the holding. This means that holdings can 
still informally affect actions of network companies. The latest revision in the Dutch Electricity 
Law, also referred to as the ‘I&I’-law of July 2004, includes provisions that make the network 
companies more ‘fat’. It arranges the economic ownership of the network assets by network 
companies (article 10a), as well as prohibits the use of network assets as a collateral in new 
financial contracts of the utility holdings (article 93b). The requirement of no financing of 
commercial activities with the network as collateral has already been imposed with respect to 
the future financial contracts of the holdings. However, the law does not specify yet the date on 
which the transfer of economic ownership comes into force. The Minister has communicated 
that he will bring this article into force in coordination with the planned moment of the full 
unbundling. 
 
4.2.3  Improved focus of network companies 
A direct consequence of unbundling is a more independent management and financing of the 
network. Unbundling increases focus of network management on the network without the need 
for compromising with other needs of an integrated holding. (OECD, 2003.) In particular, when 
network is fully unbundled from generation and supply it focuses on its own profit and not on 
 
25 The authors’ summary of Article 11(2) of the Dutch Electricity Law 1998:  
“De statuten van de netbeheerder, niet zijnde de netbeheerder van het landelijk hoogspanningsnet, bevatten in ieder geval:  
a. de instelling van een raad van commissarissen;  
b. de bepaling dat de leden van het bestuur en de meerderheid van de leden van de raad van commissarissen direct noch 
indirect binding hebben met een producent, een leverancier of een aandeelhouder van de netbeheerder;  
c. de bepaling dat aan de goedkeuring van de raad van commissarissen ten minste zijn onderworpen de besluiten van het 
bestuur van de rechtspersoon, bedoeld in artikel 164, eerste lid, of 274, eerste lid, van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, 
en  
d. de bepaling dat de aandeelhouders van de netbeheerder zich onthouden van iedere bemoeiing met de uitvoering van de 
werkzaamheden die op grond van artikel 16, eerste of tweede lid, aan een netbeheerder zijn opgedragen.” 
26 Only in the case of the national TSO TenneT the Minister has to approve the members of the supervisory board (see 
article 11a(7) of the Electricity Law).   45 
the profit of the group. As a result, it better responds to regulatory incentives and it is more 
likely to do investments that are good for facilitating competition (e.g. in technology that 
reduces switching costs). 
 
Also with respect to financing, especially full ownership unbundling secures that the cash flow 
generated by the network is not diverted to other activities, but spent in the best interests of the 
network company. Also financial ring fencing helps to prevent the risk that network may have 
insufficient financial means. In this respect options Legal-Fat Plus and Ownership Unbundling 
are better than Legal-Fat. The option of ownership unbundling is the best with respect to this 
benefit as it fully secures operational and financial independence. 
 
Notice, that cash flow is perfectly secured only if networks are kept separately and not allowed 
to merge with any other businesses, which may be also an undesirable obstacle to the movement 
of capital. In case of merging with low-risk businesses, such as other network firms (see the box 
“Economies of scope of multi-utilities”), the cash flow of the network is less at risk than in the 
case of merging with high-risk businesses. 
 
Economies of scope of multi-utilities 
Ownership unbundling  of electricity network firms enables them to merge with other network firms, for instance in 
natural, gas, water or telecom. Recently there was a tendency towards creating multi-utilities providing many network 
services, which was caused partly by liberalisation processes in many industries, where the incumbent monopolist had 
to withdraw from competitive businesses in the same industry, and partly by the desire to diversify. However, how 
desirable is this development?  
 
Fraquelli et al. (2004) show that relatively small specialised firms would benefit from economies of scale and scope by 
extending  the  activities  to  other  network  industries.  Large  firms,  however,  do  not  obtain  these  benefits  from 
diversification. The authors draw a straightforward policy implication from their finding. Since small-scale local utilities 
providing such network services as gas, electricity and water can gain from forming a multi-utility, it makes sense to 
encourage such efforts. At the same time, “keeping into account the fact that local public services have not yet been 
fully privatise, one has at best to be cautious in expecting large welfare gains from diversification moves involving large 
players” (p.2057).  
 
While highlighting the positive side of a more independent position of network companies for 
their performance, we also have to discuss two main arguments that may be used against this 
claim and explain why possible negative consequences of the increased independence of the 
networks are minor in the current context. 
 
First, there is a theoretical argument regarding the possibility of ‘hold up’ of network 
investment if the network is not vertically integrated with commercial activities: as a separated 
network firm has to share gains from their investments with other parties in the chain, it invests 
less than an integrated firm would. Therefore, separation may theoretically reduce network   46 
investment. For instance, an integrated network firm has a better incentive to invest in network 
extension than a separated network firm as this improves its opportunities for commercial 
activities. This incentive is still present in the case of legal unbundling, but may be less in the 
case of ownership unbundling. In other words, the latter may induce some network firms to 
hold up investment. In practice, however, tariff regulation serves to mitigate this problem. 
Under stronger unbundling forms, network companies better respond to regulatory incentives, 
in particular towards more efficiency and a more optimal reliability, which leads to a more 
optimal price-to-quality ratio and enhances welfare. 
 
A second argument relates to substitution between investment in the network and investment in 
generation. In some situations reinforcing the network may be more efficient than building new 
production capacity, but a non-integrated network firm may be less keen to take that decision. 
This issue is in particular important for the transmission level, but may also play a role at the 
distribution level. The management of regional transmission lines is currently done by 
distribution companies, but will, in accordance with the proposal of the Minister, be transferred 
to TenneT. As a result, unbundling does not affect this issue. Only if the proposal of the 
Minister on transmission is not implemented then vertically integrated companies may have 
better incentives to take into account the substitution between transmission and generation in 
investment decisions. However, there is a trade off between this and the effect of such 
integration on competition. The gains of more vertical integration between large-scale 
generation and transmission are likely to be offset by competition gains. As the role of 
distributed generation increases, the same argument holds also for the distribution level. See 
section 4.4 for more detail on competition issues. 
4.2.4  Economies of scale in network management 
Another theoretical advantage of ownership unbundling of regional distribution networks is the 
option to achieve positive scale effects in the network management by consolidation of these 
networks. However, this goes at the expense of loosing the possibility to apply benchmarking in 
regulation of regional distribution networks. Therefore it is important to evaluate how large the 
scale economies actually are. 
 
It appears from the economic literature that scale economies are large in transmission, but 
negligible in distribution. In particular, KEMA (2004)
27 presents numerous arguments in favour 
of merging regional and national transmission together. According to their report, cost savings 
due to more economic design of the network, better communication, and cheaper operation 
could reach up to tens of millions euros annually (the total revenue of TenneT being around 350 
 
27 This report by KEMA has been commissioned by TenneT. In KEMA(2004), transmission is defined from 50kV. However, 
in our analysis, we refer to the lines of 110kV+ as transmission, since this was conventional terminology historically. In any 
case, the lines of 110kV+ represent the bulk of transmission in the Netherlands.    47 
mln
28). Furthermore, an integrated network would be more reliable. Transfer of the 
management of transmission network of 110/150 kV to TenneT is a part of the proposal of the 
Minister of Economic Affairs on unbundling. This would improve the synergy between regional 
transmission networks and the national TSO. The proposal allows for the possibility of 
(voluntary) sale of the respective transmission networks to TenneT. 
For the distribution level, there is some evidence supporting the assumption of constant returns 
to scale. See, e.g., Pollitt (1995) and Kittelsen (2003). For Norway Kittelsen finds that “even for 
the very smallest sizes the VRS [variable returns to scale] frontier is very near CRS [constant 
returns to scale]”, implying negligible positive scale economies in distribution. 
 
Therefore, if the proposal of the Minister with respect to regional transmission is implemented 
then economies of scale in transmission are realised. Horizontally integrating distribution 
networks after this is unlikely to be beneficial. Firstly, economies of scale in this network 
hardly exist. Secondly, the regulator would lose the option of benchmarking if networks were 
integrated in one firm. Hence, the four options will be equivalent for this benefit. 
 
In contrast, if the part of the Minister’s proposal regarding transferring the management of 
transmission networks to TenneT is not implemented, then ownership unbundling may create 
larger benefits than any other option, because it increases the prospect of consolidation of 
transmission networks in the future. If regional networks are not fully unbundled from 
commercial activities, then the chance that the transmission can be merged in the future is 
smaller, because vertically integrated companies are less likely to sell their shares in 
transmission, or voluntary to transfer the management of transmission lines to TenneT.  
4.2.5  Conclusion 
Unbundling creates a more independent position of the network, which provides benefits for the 
network performance through a better focus on the objectives of the network and a better 
response to regulatory incentives. Furthermore, unbundling may have a positive effect if it leads 
to achieving scale economies in network management. Here we compare the four alternative 
options with respect to these two effects. 
 
As explained, more independence is beneficial for the performance of the network. In the 
Legal-Lean situation, which is our benchmark, networks are the least independent, as they even 
do not have economic ownership of their assets. In tariff regulation, DTe already treats the 
networks as if they were economic owners, assuming a regulatory asset base. Making networks 
‘fat’ would be a logical step that creates more transparency with respect to the network firms’ 
assets. This and a proper allocation of the strategic tasks will decrease the interference with the 
 
28 According to the annual report of TenneT (2003, p.3), in 2002 the revenue of TenneT was 358.1 mln euros.    48 
holdings and secure a better performance of the network. From this perspective, the option 
Legal-Fat is better than Legal-Lean; and the option Legal-Fat Plus is even better as it decreases 
the risk of insufficient financing. The option of ownership unbundling improves on Legal-Fat 
Plus by removing the last distortions and focuses the performance of network companies on 
their objectives the best. 
 
Regarding the possibility to realise economies of scale, we conclude that this possibility is 
mainly important for transmission. Therefore, the four options are equivalent with respect to 
this benefit, as long as the proposal of the Minister on merging the management of transmission 
lines goes through. Otherwise, the ownership unbundling option may have a larger benefit than 
the other options, as it increases the chance of merging regional transmission networks with 
TenneT in the future. 
4.3  Effectiveness and efficiency of regulation 
4.3.1  Introduction 
Introduction of unbundling implies that the role of the regulator alters. In particular strong 
structural measures, such as ownership unbundling, contribute to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of regulation.  
 
Economic literature acknowledges three main regulatory constraints: informational, 
transactional, and administrative and political, which in practice prevent regulators from 
implementing their preferable policy. (See e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993.) The literature mostly 
focuses on informational and transactional constraints. An important consequence of these two 
constraints is that contracts are inherently incomplete, and contingencies left out of incomplete 
contracts have to be filled in. In such a case, the pattern of ownership matters. 
 
Structural separation creates more transparency and leave less incentives for network 
companies for cross subsidies and other distortions, which looses both informational and 
transactional constraints, and hence contributes to more efficient and effective regulation. More 
transparency improves the informational position of the regulator, enabling setting tariffs and 
incentives more appropriately. Since the network company has less incentives to favour the 
former sister companies after unbundling, the surveillance task of the regulator becomes easier 
and more effective. 
4.3.2  Effect on incentive regulation 
In the Netherlands, distribution networks are already legally unbundled and subject to regulated 
third-party access. Network tariffs are set by the regulator (DTe) based on benchmarking of the 
companies’ standardised costs, which includes the regulatory return on capital. The regulator   49 
also creates incentives for quality by introducing financial compensations for changes in quality 
indicators. Although the tariff setting procedure is the same under all four options, unbundling 
still may have effect on its outcome through increasing the adequacy of the regulator’s 
information.  
 
As DTe argues in their advice to the Minister of Economic Affairs (DTe, April 15, 2004), 
regulation is more difficult and less effective if there is no proper division of tasks between the 
network and the respective commercial companies. The internal transactions between the 
companies within the same group are difficult to control, therefore, some freedom remains with 
respect to the (operational) cost allocation, which may affect the network tariffs. 
 
Under stronger unbundling forms, the network operator loses the possibility to strategically 
reallocate its internal costs. A vertically integrated firm would have the incentive to shift costs 
of commercial activities to the network firm and to shift resources of the latter to the 
commercial part of the group. By unbundling, the regulator obtains a better insight in the costs 
of network management. As a consequence, the regulator is able to implement more appropriate 
rules, such as efficiency targets, on network firms. 
 
Comparing across the four options, the situation already improves under Legal-Fat as compared 
to Legal-Lean, because the implementation of a proper task allocation reduces opportunity for 
shifting costs between the companies within the same group. Adding financial ring-fencing - as 
described in the option Legal-Fat Plus, i.e. adding rules restricting cash outflow - seems not to 
add much to what can be already achieved in Legal-Fat. The reason is that under the current 
legislation there is already a provision that the network assets cannot be used as a collateral in 
new contracts of the holdings. Therefore, the financial cross subsidy with respect to future 
contracts has already been eliminated, while such a cross-subsidy is still present with respect to 
the old contracts. Ownership unbundling removes last cross-subsidies and distorting actions that 
could be present under vertical integration. In addition to the improvement of information 
position of regulator, ownership unbundling also improves focus of network companies on 
regulatory incentives, increasing the effectiveness of regulation. However, it is hardly possible 
to assess the magnitude of this effect. 
4.3.3  Effect for market monitoring 
Unbundling makes the market-monitoring task of the regulator simpler and more effective 
because it reduces the incentives of the network operator to favour its subsidiary in the 
competitive segment. The information stream within the group is also difficult to control. 
Therefore, the closer the relationship between the companies in the group, the higher the risk of 
preferential treatment of the affiliated company by the network. Since interference between the 
network company and commercial divisions of the holding reduces after implementing a proper   50 
allocation of activities between the two, Legal-Fat (and also stronger options) make an 
improvement on Legal-Lean. 
 
Still, legal unbundling cannot fully remove the incentive of the network firm to give a better 
treatment to their subsidiaries. Even with extra measures with respect to customer systems, 
billing information, etc., there will always be a risk of preferential treatment and it would be 
extremely difficult to prove when sensitive information would ‘leak’ from the network to other 
holding members. Here we refer to the textbox from section 4.4. called “Some examples 
regarding risks of too little unbundling” illustrating this point. Only ownership unbundling 
eliminates this risk and creates the most effective “Chinese walls” between the network and 
commercial activities, as it fully removes such incentives. 
Conclusion 
We have distinguished two effects of unbundling on regulation: effect on incentive regulation 
and effect on the market surveillance task of the regulator. More unbundling is beneficial for 
both. The Legal-Fat as well as the Legal-Fat Plus options have higher benefits than the Legal-
Lean option, because they introduce a proper task allocation, and hence eliminate a great deal of 
possible cross-subsidies and interference between the network and commercial divisions of the 
holding. Still, the largest improvement will be achieved only in the Ownership option, since it 
removes last cross-subsidies and personal links. The surveillance task of the regulator becomes 
much easier, as networks have no incentives to favour or disadvantage any competing company. 
4.4  Degree of competition 
4.4.1  Introduction 
One of the main arguments in favour of more unbundling of distribution networks relates to 
improved competition in commercial segments, which will increase welfare. An integrated 
network company has both incentive and possibility to affect competition in the competitive 
segment. This can be done either via cross subsidies to competitive activities from the network 
or through distorting actions of the network firm. As has been said in chapter 3, unbundling 
affects competition via several routes. The improved network performance leads to less 
allocative distortion caused by high network tariffs as well as better options for new entrants for 
dispatching to the grid or for supplying. Regulation directly affects competition by insuring 
non-discriminative third-party access. Competition is also directly affected by unbundling 
through the impact of the latter on cross subsidies and distorting actions by vertically integrated 
firms. Unbundling can, however, also have a negative impact on competition: stand-alone 
commercial companies may become more prone to the risk of takeovers, which may reduce the 
number of market players.  
   51 
It is useful to distinguish between the retail segment and the production segment when 
discussing competition in the electricity market. Competition in retail directly relates to links 
between retailers and low-voltage network owners. For competition in production, the relation 
is slightly more complicated and the magnitude of benefits depends on the realisation of the 
proposal of the Minister of Economic Affairs with respect to allocation of the management of 
high voltage networks to TenneT. Before going to each of these markets in sections 4.4.3 and 
4.4.4 respectively, we first discuss sources and effects of cross subsidies and other distortions. 
 
4.4.2  Cross subsidies, information advantages, distorting actions and risk of consolidation 
If management of the network is conducted independently from commercial activities, 
competition between commercial activities, upstream as well as downstream, could improve. 
Without independent network management, cross-subsidies and strategic investment behaviour 
of the network firm could distort competition. Unbundling could remove these distortions, 
although the former incumbent would preserve some competitive advantages, such as initial 
relationships with customers.  
 
We distinguish several forms of market distortions: 
 
·  Direct cross subsidies by cash-flows between network part and commercial parts; 
·  Indirect cross subsidies by financing advantages; 
·  Information advantages due to the close relationship between network activity and commercial 
activities; 
·  By firms’ actions.  
 
Cross subsidies 
Direct flows of cash between network and commercial parts are an evident example of cross-
subsidy. If an integrated firm can use cash generated by the network part for commercial 
activities, this subsidy distorts competition in the commercial markets. It is in the interest of the 
integrated firm to raise the access fee above its optimal level, for instance by strategically 
reallocating costs and benefits within the holding. Given an information advantage of the 
integrated firm over the regulator, the most likely outcome is a network access fee which is ‘too 
high’ from a welfare point of view. Theoretically, this problem is curbed by unbundling of 
accounts. However, in practice, there is no possibility to control for all internal transactions as 
long as the firm remains integrated. Therefore, prices of network services may be distorted. 
 
One form of cross subsidy is a direct flow of cash to commercial parts which may arise when 
the network owner charges his subsidiary a lower price than it does the competitors. But even if 
prices are non-discriminatory, access pricing above marginal costs leaves the integrated firm in 
an advantageous position, whereas above marginal cost pricing is required to finance the fixed   52 
costs of the network (see e.g. Baumol et al., 1997, Laffont and Tirole, 1994 and Armstrong et 
al., 1996). The argument that the network access fee may be above its socially optimal level is 
however not exclusively linked to vertical integration. A non-integrated network monopolist 
also has the incentive and ability to raise its price above the socially optimal level. However, the 
marginal costs of the downstream product of an integrated firm are not affected by the higher 
access fee, whereas the costs of non-integrated firms are. Therefore, the incumbent vertically 
integrated firm may foreclose the market for new entrants.  
 
Cross-subsidies could also arise with respect to financing: bundling networks with competitive 
activities leads to a credit rating below the pure credit rating for the network and above that for 
competitive activities. Although any other large firm with capital-intensive, low-risk activities 
in other parts of the economy (e.g. a company with real-estate activities) would also be able to 
obtain low-cost financing, this type of cross-subsidisation would still have to follow market 
rules, whereas cross-subsidies from monopoly activities would not. If this form of cross subsidy 
hinders entrants and leads to market power in the competitive segment, complete unbundling 
may be an effective way to eliminate it.  
Information advantages 
Information advantages can also be a form of cross-subsidy bringing new entrants in a 
disadvantage. The owner of the network has a superior information position. A vertically 
integrated firm may have the incentive to use the superior information position of the network 
to create an unlevel playing field in favour of companies that belong to the same group, and to 
disadvantage new, potentially more efficient entrants.  
 
Distorting actions 
In addition to cross-subsidies, competition between commercial activities can also be affected 
by actions of the network firm. Given that there is always an incentive for an integrated firm to 
maximise joint profit with their sister companies, there is a risk of soft discrimination of other 
companies by the network. Recent economic literature on third party access issues has focused 
on non-price discrimination or sabotage (see e.g. Economides, 1998, Beard et al., 2001 and 
Mandy, 2000). Sabotage is defined as discriminatory provision of the input that raises rivals’ 
marginal costs, and is also referred to as ‘3D-practices’ (‘3D’ standing for Deny, Delay, Detail). 
The literature reveals that the more efficient price regulation is, the greater the incentive for 
sabotage. We give examples of the latter in the Box called “Some examples regarding risks of 
too little unbundling”.  
 
Concluding, cross subsidies, informational advantages and distorting actions of network firms 
negatively affect competition. Unbundling reduces these distortions, in particular by improving 
incentives of the network firms, enabling better regulation and market monitoring, and   53 
facilitating better competition in the contestable segment of the market. As a result, 
theoretically, unbundling raises allocative efficiency. Moreover, improved competition 
conditions could induce entry and lead to supply firms operating more cheaply and efficiently.
29  
Some examples regarding risks of too little unbundling  
Recent history shows some evidence on risks of vertical integration in liberalised energy markets.  
A  KPMG  report  (KPMG,  2004),  commissioned  by  DTe  after  a  signal  from  Greenchoice  (an  entrant  in  the  Dutch 
electricity  market)  about  the  unfair  situation  in  the  market,  provides  some  evidence  of  preventing  entry  by  cross-
subsidies.  According  to  this  document,  the  use  of  the  network  assets  when  financing  supply  activities  (‘100% 
garantiestelling’) may create barriers to entry. Furthermore, they conclude that the unfair allocation of payments for the 
tasks that the network company delegates to supply companies in order to facilitate administration, which may also 
affect the level-playing field in the market.  
Events  following  the  bankruptcy  of  Energy  XS  raised  suspicion  regarding  ‘non-price  discrimination’.  After  this 
bankruptcy, all network companies having responsibility to appoint last-resort supplier for the customers of Energy XS in 
their areas, have appointed their sister-company. Since the sister-companies of network companies used to supply the 
respective  customers  in  the  past,  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  if these  companies  consequently  contracted the 
majority  of  those  customers  based  on  their  old  information  or  based  on  new  information  that  they  received  for 
emergency supply. DTe could not tell if the client information was used by supply companies purely for emergency 
supply or also for commercial purposes.
a 
Furthermore, there were signals from new entrants regarding the sluggishness in information exchange, because of 
which they cannot send bills on time. Also, many customers complained to DTe about missing bills, or bills being sent 
very late. Therefore, DTe has been investigating the reasons why the information is delivered to new entrants too late. 
(See the press release of DTe of November 10, 2004.)  
It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the effect of these problems on entry. We can only look at the number of those 
suppliers who have actually entered the market, and not at the number of those who considered entry but did not enter 
because of possible ‘non-price’ discrimination. The retailers that supply to small customers are obliged to get a licence, 
therefore, we can get insight in the number of entrants in this segment of the market. The most successful entrant in this 
market is Energiebedrijf.com (now operating under the name Oxxio) who has currently about 0.5 mln connections in the 
Netherlands. This company entered the market when the green energy market was liberalised and there were large 
subsidies for green energy, while incumbents did not reduce green energy prices below they grey energy prices. (See 
van Damme and Zwart, 2003.) In addition to Energiebefrijf.com (Oxxio), there are about ten other new licence holders, 
however, they are smaller. Some of them are under the same mother company. We have already witnessed several 
mergers and takeovers of new electricity retailers (e.g., a recent takeover of Echte Energie by ONS; Evolta and Durion 
by Energiebedrijf.com.) See section 4.4.3 for more discussion regarding the current situation in the retail market and the 
effects of entry on welfare. 
 
a
 According tot the press release of DTe of October 15, 2003. 
 
 
29 Contrary to the theoretically founded relationship between competition and allocative efficiency, the impact of competition 
on technical efficiency is less clear as firms are assumed always to strive for cost minimisation regardless of the degree of 
competition. Nevertheless, evidence on a positive impact of competition on productivity exists. Markiewicz et al (2004), for 
instance, found a positive relationship between liberalising energy markets and technical efficiency of power producers.   54 
Consolidation 
Unfortunately, unbundled commercial firms may become less strong financially and, hence, 
more prone to the risk of mergers and takeovers. As a consequence, the number of competitors 
may reduce.  
 
It is often emphasised that the Dutch companies may be taken over by foreign utilities. By 
itself, a takeover by a foreign company is not necessarily bad: there are many utilities in the 
world owned by foreign companies. Also some Dutch energy holdings own energy companies 
abroad (e.g. Essent and Nuon own firms in Germany), and the other way around: some Dutch 
generators are owned by foreigners (e.g. by Electrabel). The share of foreign-owned suppliers in 
the electricity market is substantial in the countries which have liberalised their energy markets 
most strongly: United Kingdom and Sweden (see table 4.1). The degree of foreign ownership 
does not indicate anything about the degree of competition in the market. Far more important is 
how takeovers will impact the number of competitors and the market shares of the largest firms. 
Therefore, we have to analyse a trade-off between competition-enhancing effects of more 
entrants on the one hand and competition-hindering effects of more consolidation.  
 
4.4.3  Retail competition 
The above theoretical analysis suggests that further unbundling improves the market situation 
and facilitates stronger competition between incumbents and entrants. Currently, the position of 
entrants is less strong than that of vertically integrated incumbents. The textbox “Some 
examples regarding risks of too little unbundling” gives some evidence. With an improved 
allocation of tasks and respective formal procedures put in place, the network activities become 
better separated from retail activities, reducing incentives and opportunities for cross-subsidies 
and soft-discrimination. Compared to Legal-Lean, the situation improves under both Legal-Fat 
and Legal-Fat Plus options, approximately to the same degree, and under ownership unbundling 
to a higher degree, as only ownership unbundling is able to fully remove these incentives and 
possibilities. 
New entrants 
As said, unbundling is likely to improve the possibilities of entry in retail. However, whether 
and to what extent entry actually will take place, depends on several factors. Entry is more 
likely in a growing market than in a market in decline. The Dutch electricity market will 
continue to grow in the coming decades (see e.g. ECN/RIVM, 2005), stimulating entry. Given 
the low or absent economies of scale in retail, no significant barriers to entry are expected. 
However, there may be imperfections on both the consumer side and the firms’ side that may 
reduce or deter entry.  
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On the consumer side, switching costs may play role. Such costs may be especially important in 
the market for small residential customers.
30 In addition to financial switching costs (e.g. 
switching fees), also other switching costs exist, for instance costs associated with uncertainty 
about the market or psychological hurdles. High (perceived) switching costs make it harder on 
entrants to gain market share after entry. On the other hand, high switching costs leave room for 
higher profit margins, thus rendering entry more profitable. The net effect of switching costs on 
entry is ambiguous.  
 
Although it is not clear how much entry will actually occur after unbundling, we can get an 
impression of the welfare effects of entry in retail. Let us first note that retailers compete in 
two-part tariffs and that it is clear from economic theory that it is optimal to realise price-cost 
margins in the standing charge rather than in the per unit price. This implies that an increase in 
competition (e.g. through entry) will reduce the standing charge rather than the per unit price, 
which has no effects on consumption volumes. Therefore, static effects coming from entry are 
distributive. Still, in the case if retailers are foreign companies, the allocation of surplus 
between retailers and their customers affects national welfare. Turning to dynamic effects, 
obviously, efficiency gains from increased competitive pressure may increase welfare in the 
longer run, although the relationship between the degree of competition and dynamic efficiency 
is not straightforward. An increase in retail competition may also positively affect competition 
in generation, as retailers are pressed to minimise costs. 
Splitting up the network from other activities and liberalisation of the market could lead to an 
increase in the number of players active in the commercial activities, which may result in higher 
costs of coordination. These costs could consist of for instance slackening the pace of decision 
making. In addition, an increase in the number of players could make it difficult to identify 
which company is responsible for a failure (e.g. why the customer switch has not been 
performed on time, why bills are delayed). Moreover, it could make it difficult and/or costly to 
write enforceable contracts on this, because collection of information and conflict resolution are 
costly. This may affect both costs and quality of service in energy supply. However, such an 
effect is more attributed to the introduction of competition ( i.e. to access of several market 
players to the network and the need for the duplication of information stream in the liberalised 
market), than to unbundling. 
 
Both the distributive effects and the efficiency gains in retail are unlikely to be very large. From 
a recent study by Lijesen (2002), it can be deduced that increasing the number of retailers from 
 
30 Such markets are in general characterised by the low activity of customers. According to the EC (2004, p.9), “ based on 
experience of those member states which have already had a competitive market for some time one might expect a well 
functioning market share to have around 15-20% of business changing suppliers every year with most, if not all, seeking to 
renegotiate tariffs with their current supplier every year. For households, an annual level of switching of perhaps 10% would 
be seen a reasonable benchmark.”    56 
3 to 4 leads to a decrease of the standing charge of approximately 14%, boiling down to 1% of 
total electricity expenditure for an average household. Likewise, dynamic efficiency gains will 
be limited, simply because retail costs form only a small part of total electricity costs.
31 On top 
of the dynamic effects, the disappearance of cost-increasing non-price discrimination will 
enhance welfare, but again, the order of magnitude is probably fairly small for the same reasons 
mentioned above.  
 
Regarding the small-customers segment, a countervailing effect of retail competition is brought 
forward by Joskow and Tirole (2004). They address the consequences of ‘load profiling’, 
finding that a better outcome
32 can be achieved by a (regulated) monopoly retailer that uses 
two-part tariffs than by retail competition. This is because under retail competition with no real-
time metering, retailers cannot face the real-time wholesale price for the aggregate consumption 
of their customers, but an average price. In contrast, a monopoly retailer in an area would be 
able to observe the total load in real-time and to face the real-time wholesale price, thus 
increasing the efficiency of its electricity purchases by time of day. This argument may loose 
significance in the near future because of technical developments, such as real-time metering or 
the development of a real-time spot market. Newbery (2002a) mentions another argument 
against retail competition for small customers. In his view, a monopoly for small customers (up 
to 50-100 kW) is likely more able to act as a viable counterparty for medium and long term 
contracts compared to independent retailers. However, the net benefits of such a development 
are not straightforward, as they depend on the respective regulatory costs and effectiveness. 
Consolidation in the retail market 
As said in the former section, unbundling possibly increases the risk of consolidation. What can 
we expect for the retail market? Table 4.1 below illustrates the ownership situation in the retail 
market in other countries, as presented in the latest benchmarking report of the European 
Commission. The retail markets in several European countries including the Netherlands were 
characterised by high concentration, with a high share of the ‘Top 3’ and a small number of 
suppliers with market share larger than 5%. Notice, the United Kingdom and Norway that are 
somewhat ahead of other countries with competition have a lower concentration. For the 
Netherlands, the figure for the share of ‘Top 3’ reflects the situation in the household market
33, 
however, the market for larger customers is also characterised by high concentration. The ‘Top 
3’ suppliers - Essent, Eneco and Nuon - were created in the consolidation processes that took 
place over the last few years.  
 
31 Even in the extreme case where retail profits are absent, total expenditures on electricity decrease by less than 5 percent. 
32 In economic terms, in a world with homogeneous consumers and on traditional meters, a monopoly retailer can achieve a 
second best outcome provided that it charges two-part tariffs, while retail competition achieves a third best outcome. 
33 Source: DTe (Marktconcentratie op de kleinverbruikersmarkt voor elektriciteit en gas per 1 juli 2004).   57 
Table 4.1  Market shares retail electricity supply 










Top 3 suppliers’ 
share 
(all consumers) 
Market share of 
foreign owned 
suppliers 
        (in %)  (in %) 
           
Austria  144  19  4  67  2 
Belgium  41  17
a)  2  c.90  <10 
Denmark  69  23  5  67  n.k. 
Finland  70  8  6  30  25 
France  20-25  15  1  88  9 
Germany  1050  100  3  50  c.20 
Ireland  9  7  4  88  12 
Italy  305  270  6  35  n.k. 
Luxemburg  12  1  2  100
  0 
Netherlands  37  16  3  88 
b)   18 
Norway  130  70  4  44  2 
Portugal  4  3  3  99  33 
Spain  70  62  5  85  8 
Sweden  127  127  4  70  39 
UK  80  66  6  60  50 
 
Source: EC (2005) Fourth benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas markets, Technical Annexes, 
p.23. We do not include new member states, as there the reforms began later. Here n.k.= not known, c.=circa. 
Notes: 
a)
 Although independent, the two most important suppliers have strong ownership links with DSO’s. 
b)
 For household customers.  
 
The second column in Table 4.1 shows the number of independent supply companies, who do 
not own distribution networks in the respective countries.
34 The number of such suppliers is 
relatively large in some countries. Also, in the Netherlands, in the period of survey, there were 
about 16 supply companies who do not possess networks. (Notice, not all of them belonged to 
different mother companies.) Among the entrants into the Dutch energy market there are many 
large foreign utility companies. Some of them were already active in the Dutch energy market 
before (e.g., Electrabel and E.ON who have shares in Dutch generators), while some began to 
penetrate the market only recently (e.g. Greenchoice and Energiebedrijf.com, now under the 
name of Oxxio). Furthermore, there are companies that are expanding their activities in the 
Netherlands from one energy product to both gas and electricity (e.g., RWE Obragas and RWE 
Haarlemmermeergas). Still the concentration in the Dutch market is relatively high, as most 
customers are still supplied by the three large incumbent energy companies. Given such a high 
concentration and no full integration in the electricity market, it is unlikely that further mergers 
of the ‘Top3’commercial companies can be allowed by NMa, irrespectively of unbundling, 




34 It is likely that data for some countries, such as Belgium and Sweden, reflect legal or organisational independence, rather 
than ownership independence.  
35 One of the problems to be dealt with is cross-border ownership which requires competitive measures on international 
(European) level.   58 
Several characteristics of the retail electricity market make this market to be prone to the risk of 
formation of a tight oligopoly, i.e. a structure that can enable the incumbents to realise 
supranormal profits for a substantial period of time (Canoy et al., 2003). These characteristics 
include the limited number of suppliers, the relatively high switching costs, the low elasticity of 
demand, the rather stable level of demand (on annual basis) and hurdles for entry. Because of 
these characteristics, the incumbents are able to (implicitly) coordinate their activities. A 
conceivable example of such coordinated activities is the way the incumbents deal with 
administrative restructuring and the problems following from it. Unbundling the incumbents 
likely reduces the risk of formation of a tight oligopoly to some extent as it improves conditions 
for entrants.  
Conclusion 
Concluding on the effect of unbundling on retail competition, unbundling is likely to promote 
entry in retail, but the net welfare effects are limited. However, unbundling may tackle a 
potential tight oligopoly to some extent. Because of the pricing structure in retail, price 
decreases are likely to be distributive rather than total welfare effects. Moreover, retail costs and 
margins form a relatively small part of total electricity costs and finally, there may be welfare 
losses in the market segment that requires load profiling. The impact of unbundling on 
consolidation in the Dutch retail market is probably negligible because of the current high level 
of concentration. This threat of increased consolidation is likely to be dealt with by the 
competition authority. Although direct welfare effects of increased competition in retail are 
likely to be small, indirectly welfare may increase due to the impact of retail competition on the 
wholesale market.  
4.4.4  Wholesale competition 
Improved performance of networks, more effective regulation and fewer opportunities for cross 
subsidisation and other distortions also affect wholesale competition. The magnitude of the 
effect of unbundling on wholesale competition depends on three factors: ownership of the 
transmission grid by the distribution companies, future development of small-scale generation, 
and development of the North-Western European power market. 
Ownership of transmission lines 
When both regional transmission and the main generation in the respective area belong to the 
same direct owner, the scope for gaming in generation exists. Such a network has both 
incentives and opportunities to strategically affect competition in production. Competition 
between producers may be harmed in three ways. 
 
·  Vertically integrated generation incumbents may hinder entry or harm entrants’ operations by 
‘non-price discrimination’ (similarly to the examples in the textbox in section 4.4.2).   59 
Unbundling transmission and generation is therefore likely to facilitate entry in electricity 
production, which leads to an increase in welfare as well as induce improvements in productive 
efficiency and raise the level of supply security. The higher level of supply security comes from 
the mechanism that producers realise their profit margins by offering lower levels of capacity. 
An increase in the number of competitors will lower profit margins through an increased level 
of capacity supplied to the market (also see Lijesen and Vollaard, 2004). We can obtain an 
impression of the order of magnitude of the welfare effects by looking at the price effects from 
entry. Simulations with CPB’s model for the electricity market (Ten Cate and Lijesen, 2004) 
show that an extra entrant in generation would bring average per unit prices down by 9 %. 
Other than in the case of retail, per unit prices are affected, so that not only distributional effects 
arise, but welfare effects as well. 
 
·  A vertically integrated firm has a strong incentive to adjust its capacity choice in order to have 
its generator gain locational market power (Joskow, 2004). 
 
·  A third threat if transmission lines are vertically integrated with electricity producers is a very 
specific one, in which the only generator in a region is vertically integrated with the 
transmission network in a neighbouring region. It can then influence the ability of its 
neighbouring transmission lines operator to resolve congestion, thus creating a very favourable 
position for its own generator. 
 
At least two options exist to deal with these threats for wholesale competition: reallocation of 
transmission lines to the TSO (TenneT) and unbundling of the distribution firms. Given the 
importance of regional transmission lines for wholesale competition, their unbundling from 
production is especially important. Therefore, if the proposal of the Minister regarding 
transferring the management of the regional transmission lines to TenneT does not take place 
and distribution companies continue to manage these lines, unbundling of distribution 
companies from production will bring very large benefits.  
Future of small-scale generation 
The Netherlands has quite some small-scale generation capacity, amounting to approximately 
17 percent of total generation capacity (Timpe and Scheepers, 2003). Future predictions range 
from a stable share to an increase to 27 percent (op. cit., p. 16). Most small producers generate 
electricity primarily to cater for their own needs and sell the surplus to the market. It is not their 
main activity to sell electricity, but merely a side effect. However, technical developments may 
change this. As distributed regulation becomes more and more important, regulators begin to 
pay more attention to creating right incentives for regulated network companies to facilitate 
such generation. See, e.g. the recent decision documents of Ofgem (2005) and DTe (2004c)   60 
covering this issue. Especially if virtual utilities are created by coordinating small producers, 
they may form a substantial competitive fringe.
36  
 
One important aspect in virtual utilities competing with large scale generators is the level at 
which they deliver their production to the network. Small-scale generators feed into the 
distribution network, whereas regular power plants feed into the transmission network. This 
difference may be important because, as Ackermann et al. (2001) point out, distribution 
networks are often designed for a different purpose than transmission networks. This causes 
differences in costs that are unfavourable for small-scale generators. 
 
If incumbent producers are vertically integrated with owners of distribution networks, they have 
an incentive to exaggerate the cost difference between transmission a distribution networks, as 
this enhances the competitive position of their power plants vis-à-vis virtual utilities. Wals et al. 
(2003) and Connor and Mitchell (2002) report complaints from small scale producers over high 
connection costs charged by distribution network operators. High fees for delivering to the local 
network as well as non-price discrimination are likely to dampen the success of small producers 
in the market place. Even if the regulator will be able to perfectly regulate feed-in tariffs, the 
network owner may hinder downstream competitors through non-price discrimination. This 
may for instance take the form of delaying decisions to connect, delaying needed repairs, giving 
incomplete, untimely or incorrect information on balancing needs and so on. 
 
Both Legal-Fat options increase the possibilities for regulators to act against practices as 
described above. The incentive for the integrated firm is not affected, however. Hindering 
virtual utilities, either through access fees or through non-price discrimination, is in the interest 
of the group or holding to which they belong. Ownership unbundling would eliminate these 
incentives. Therefore, ownership unbundling is a more effective cure than the Legal-Fat 
options. 
 
Ownership unbundling prohibits distribution network owners to invest in local generation 
capacity, possibly disabling them to gain economies of scope from this combination. These 
economies of scope may arise because of the use of the network owner’s own production 
capacity to resolve congestion. Note, however, that restoring balance can be contracted 
perfectly (as is the case with transmission in many countries), and does not require shared 
ownership. Investment decisions may be altered, since an integrated producer is likely to 
consider network solutions and capacity solutions jointly. Possible efficiency gains from this 
integrated decision will be lost in the case of ownership unbundling. 
 
36 Virtual utilities, also referred to as distributed generation, consists of coordinated small plants, often combined heat and 
power plants or renewable sources. See Künneke (2003) and Awerbuch and Preston (1996) for a more extensive 
discussion.   61 
North-Western European power market 
Let us now look on the issue of consolidation in the context of the North-Western European 
market. Given that consolidation processes also take place at the European level, will there be 
enough market players in the future European market? Table 4.2 shows the presence of the 
largest utilities in several European countries. If the Dutch production firms are to be taken over 
after ownership unbundling, then the main potential buyers may belong to this list. We observe 
that at the moment seven companies exits that are both large as well as internationally active, 
notably RWE, EON, EDF, Electrabel (E-BEL), CENTRICA, Vattenfall (VF) and ENDESA. 
Six of these players are already active on the North-Western European market and a takeover of 
a Dutch generator by one of them may therefore increase market concentration. Not from the 
table, however, that the number of suppliers will still be substantial in this case. 
 
In addition, a number of smaller companies that are of local significance in certain European 
countries can be viewed as potential buyers as they might still develop the ambition to explore 
their activities across borders. Moreover, the existence of quite a large number of Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) world-wide suggests that the operation of power plants without a 
network is an economically viable activity.
37 Some of these IPPs are already active in several 
European countries (Germany, UK, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Netherlands). Several large IPPs are 
known to have expanded either by acquisitions of individual plants (e.g. Intergen, International 
Power) or by acquiring small producer companies (e.g.TECO). Firms like these may be 
interested in increasing their European operations further in a similar manner. According to EIA 
(1996, p14), “Among U.S. companies, independent power producers have been among the most 
active in seeking overseas energy project investments.”. Furthermore, the indication that power 
generation is by itself a viable activity implies that, after implementation of ownership 
unbundling, the generation firms can be taken-over by a firm from outside the electricity-utility 
industry. Recently, IPP Intergen was sold to corporate investors American International Group 
and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan. (NRC, 2005.) 
 
37 IPP’s obviously operate in a different manner than traditional utilities. Woolf and Halpern (2001) discuss market structures 
and trading arrangements aimed at reaping the full benefits of IPP’s for wholesale competition.   62 
Table 4.2  Presence of largest utilities in the electricity industry in selected individual member states 
     
  Largest  Other significant 
     
Austria  VERBUND   RWE, EON, EDF  
Belgium   E-BEL   EDF, ESSENT, NUON, CENTRICA  
Denmark   ELSAM   E2, VF, EON  
Finland   FORTUM GASUM  VF, EON  
France   EDF   E-BEL, ENDESA  
Germany   RWE   EON, VF, EDF  
Ireland   ESB   NIE (Viridian)  
Italy   ENEL   E-BEL, ENDESA, EDISON, VERBUND 
Netherlands   E-BEL
a)  ESSENT, NUON, EON 
Portugal   EDP GDP  ENDESA  
Spain   ENDESA   IBERDROLA, EDP, ENEL, UNION FENOSA  
Sweden   VF   EON, FORTUM  
UK     EDF , EON, RWE, CENTRICA  
 
Source: EC (2005) Fourth benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas markets, Technical Annexes, p.8. 
As before, we do not include new member states.  
Notes: 
a)
 Our own estimates for the Netherlands presented in Table 5.1 of this report show that the share of Essent and Electrabel in 
production are roughly the same.  
 
Conclusion 
Concluding on the effect of unbundling on competition in electricity production, we find that a 
higher degree of unbundling of generation and transmission networks enhances the position of 
new entrants and may lead to substantial welfare gains. Unbundling of generation and 
distribution networks increases the opportunities for small-scale producers to compete in the 
electricity market, which is especially relevant if the concept of virtual utilities is further 
developed in practice. Such a development is more likely if there is much entry in distributed 
generation, which is also facilitated by stronger unbundling of distribution networks. Finally, 
ownership unbundling may result in sales of generation owned by Dutch utility holdings to 
foreign firms, however, this is unlikely to have a large effect on competition on the North-
Western European power market. 
4.5  Benefits of privatisation  
4.5.1  Introduction 
Unbundling network activities from commercial activities enables public shareholders to sell 
one of these activities separately. More specifically, it enables public authorities to privatise the 
commercial part of the currently publicly-owned integrated firms. Complete unbundling would 
give public shareholders who do not want to run risky businesses a way out, while at the same 
time, keeping the essential facility, notably the network, in public hands.  
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In this analysis, we only go into the effects of privatisation of commercial parts of the holding 
without giving attention to the effects of privatisation of networks. Our point is that in the 
current situation in the Netherlands, with privatisation of networks have been delayed at least 
until 2007, creating the possibility to privatise commercial activities becomes a benefit. The 
textbox “Privatisation experiences in distribution networks” included in this section touches 
upon literature on privatisation of distribution networks. 
 
Section 4.5.2 discusses the effect of unbundling on the possibility to privatise commercial parts 
of the distribution companies. Section 4.5.3 analyses the impact of unbundling and privatisation 
of commercial parts on efficiency and value of these firms. 
Privatisation experiences in distribution networks 
The benefits of privatisation depend on the contractibility of network management as well as the direction of managers 
incentives (see Hart et al. (1997) on the role of contractibility in the choice between public and private ownership). The 
larger  the  uncertainty  about  the  performance  of  networks  in  private  hands,  the  more  societies  will  value  public 
ownership. We refer to CPB et al. (2004) that addresses general issues that arise with respect to privatisation of 
networks, in particular those related to reliability. 
 
In particular for transmission networks, contractibility is a large issue and may affect reliability. These networks are often 
in hands of states. For distribution networks the problem of contractibility is smaller. We observe cases of privatisation of 
such networks in other countries. There exists also empirical literature regarding the effects of privatisation of electricity 
networks. For example, Domah and Pollitt (2000) find that privatisation has brought benefits to customers in the UK. In 
contrast, Mota (2004), who addresses the effect of privatisation on the performance of Brazilian utilities, reports a 
negative and statistically significant result of privatisation in Brazil in several models that focus on total cost efficiency. 
Only  when  focusing  on  operational  efficiency  (i.e.  excluding  capital  cost),  a  positive  (but  insignificant)  effect  of 
privatisation is found. However, Mota (2004) suggests that the results should be taken with caution, not only because of 
difficulties with construction capital cost figures, but also because of low investment in Brazil in pre-privatisation time 
and a fast rate of substitution of capital for labour. 
 
4.5.2  Withdrawal of public capital from commercial activities 
Dutch incumbent energy companies are historically in public hands. They belong to local 
authorities and the current law prevents sales of the networks to private shareholders, as 50% of 
the network assets should remain with the current owners. At the same time, since the energy 
market in the Netherlands has been liberalised, the energy holdings already perform a number 
of commercial activities and get involved in financially risky businesses, such as acquiring 
companies abroad. Theoretically, as there is no prohibition to sell commercial activities, these 
can be sold by holdings already. There is an example of such an intention in the Dutch energy 
market - a combined sale of the retail businesses of NRE and Intergas.
38  
 
38 Also, before the condition of 50% public ownership was introduced with respect networks, two integrated incumbent gas 
companies, Obragas and Haarlemmermeer, were sold to RWE.   64 
Several of the public shareholders of distribution companies prefer to sell the commercial parts 
of these companies as these shareholders do not want to be active in risky, entrepreneurial 
activities. In the case of legal unbundling, the management of the holding is able to sell parts, 
such as generation plants or retail firms, but this does not imply that the shareholders would 
always benefit from such transactions. In the current structure, the holding can decide to use the 
revenues from the transaction for other activities, for instance abroad, instead of transferring it 
to the shareholders. In the prevailing Dutch governance system (called ‘structuurregime’), the 
ultimate shareholders, such as regional and local authorities in the energy sector, are not able to 
effectively influence companies’ decisions with respect to both divestiture and destination of 
the proceeds of the divesture. 
 
Changing the governance structure so as to increase the power of public shareholders in this 
respect would be one option to deal with this issue. Another option is ownership separation. 
Given the uncertainty regarding the Parliamentary decision on privatisation of the network 
companies, ownership unbundling would provide public shareholders, who may not want to 
hold risky commercial businesses, with a way out. Under the current corporate governance, this 
is realised only under the option of ownership unbundling, and not under the other options. 
4.5.3  Unbundling, privatisation and the value of commercial firms  
Unbundling a firm in separated companies may raise the total value because of increased 
transparency about future cash flows and the feasibility of a financial structure which make 
commercial parts operate more efficiently. Many utility holdings are conglomerates with 
multiple goals. Literature provides several reasons why a conglomerate structure may be 
inferior to having separate owners.  
 
·  Unbundling of conglomerates could induce better investment opportunities. For instance, a 
pension fund may not be interested to buy a conglomerate with risky businesses, while it may 
be interested to invest in a low risk network business. By bundling these activities together, 
these investors will be excluded from the list of potential buyers.  
 
·  A split structure is more transparent and hence better manageable. In a separated structure, 
managers of each firm can strongly focus on their own business, while in an integrated setting 
interests of a particular division, say the network division, can be compromised by the needs of 
other divisions (OECD, 2003). This argument, of course, only holds if economies of scope do 
not compensate for the costs of managing a conglomerate. Moreover, corporate separation 
possibly increases transparency on inefficiencies of the corporate. 
 
A large stream of related literature exists on the issue of the optimal financing structure, 
predominantly based on principal-agent theory and agency costs theory. Recent examples   65 
include Denis et al., 1997 and Burkart et al., 1997. Unbundling may improve options to choose 
the optimal financial structure. According to corporate finance literature (e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), a large share of equity financing implies that managers have limited 
incentives to earn a profit, whereas a large share of debt financing urges managers to invest in 
high-risk projects. The trade-off between these costs implies the existence of an optimal capital 
structure, which is probably different for a network firm and a generation firm or a retail firm. If 
this difference is large, the effect of bundling these activities is that they can not reach their 
optimal debt-equity ratio.  
 
Agency costs are thought to be higher in diversified firms because individual shareholders do 
not have the ability to monitor and discipline managers adequately. This implies that 
shareholders are likely to prefer equity in focused firms, thus raising the value of those firms. 
Recent empirical work, though, overviewed in Matsusaka (2001) is not conclusive on the effect 
of diversification of firm activities on the firm value. 
 
·  Some economists argue that private shareholders do a better job in monitoring managers than 
do public shareholders (e.g. Karpoff, 2001). As the commercial parts of energy companies are 
more likely to have private shareholders after unbundling, this would imply that unbundling 
increases the efficiency of these firms. 
 
The vertically integrated distribution companies in the Netherlands have realised relatively low 
returns on investments. In 2003, their dividend yield was approximately 1.5% for the largest 
companies, while the regulator guarantees a much higher return to the network assets (see 
figure 4.1). However, this information has to be interpreted with caution, because the rate of 
dividends does not fully reflect return on capital: companies may use the returns in other ways, 
e.g. to do efficient investment.    66 
Figure 4.1  Dividend yield of energy firms, 2003 
         A       B   C        D
(A) Dutch Government Bond with 5 years maturity as per 30 January 2005 (risk free rate)
(B) Yield Fixed Bond (Single A) is assumed as risk free rate plus 70 basis points
(C) Dividend Yield comparable listed European energy companies
(D) DTe Allowed Return on Equity. Source: Dte, nominal and after tax
Source: Annual Reports 2003, Calculated as paid divident divided by estimated market value
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Source: Sequoia (2004). 
 
According to Sequoia (2004), complete unbundling would improve performance of the 
commercial firms and, hence, their value. Others believe, however, that in the Dutch situation 
buyers will exercise their market power and, hence, offer a lower price, since splitting does not 
only allow for sales of competitive businesses, but also forces such sales while the number of 
potential buyers is limited (Van Damme et al., 2004). 
 
Interestingly, two Dutch companies have voluntarily announced their decision to unbundle fully 
their competitive activities from the network.
39 From this we can conclude that these companies 
do not expect a decrease of their value after unbundling. Note, however, that these companies 
are much smaller than the three large incumbents. International experiences with voluntary 
unbundling (see Chapter 2) also support the view that ownership unbundling may be good for a 
company value.
40 
4.5.4  Conclusion 
Under the current corporate governance, public authorities have very limited options to impose 
privatisation of commercial parts. Ownership unbundling strongly improves possibilities of 
public shareholders to privatise commercial firms. The other forms of unbundling do not affect 
 
39 See transaction-cost literature for more detail regarding the choice of the organisation form by a firm, e.g. Joskow (2003b).  
40 The energy industry has shown several voluntary separation initiatives, such as by British Gas. In the telecom industry 
several vertically integrated firms have considered voluntary separation, such as Rochester Telephone and British Telecom, 
but they eventually concluded that the costs incurred would be higher than the benefits (OECD, 2003).  
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these possibilities. Another option to the withdrawal of public capital from commercial 
activities is a further improvement of the corporate governance. 
 
Regarding the impact of unbundling on value of the separate firms, we conclude that the 
theoretical and empirical literature is inconclusive. By itself, an increase of efficiency and a 
positive effect on the value of a company may provide a reason for voluntary unbundling but do 
not necessarily justify enforced unbundling. Conversely, if these arguments for unbundling 
hold, they are reason for voluntary unbundling. Note however that the private decision not to 
unbundle does not imply that the benefits discussed here are smaller than the costs of 
unbundling, as that decision may be biased by private benefits, such as market power, that are 
not in the public interest. 
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5  Costs of unbundling 
5.1  Introduction 
Unbundling a vertically integrated firm involves several types of costs. In section 3, we have 
distinguished the following categories: transitional costs, loss of economies of scope, and 
increased risk of hold-up of investment in generation. Here we address each of these costs in 
more detail. 
 
5.2  Transitional costs 
5.2.1  Introduction 
Unbundling results in costs of restructuring companies’ offices and rearranging contracts of 
integrated companies with other parties. Here we speak about one-off transaction costs
41 
associated with these processes. In the context of restructuring Dutch energy distribution 
companies, a special issue arises with respect to one type of financial contracts: cross-border 
leases. Therefore we present this issue separately in section 5.2.2, and analyse the effect of 
other transitional costs separately in section 5.2.3, ending the analysis with conclusions in 
section 5.2.4. 
5.2.2  Cross-border leases 
The existing cross-border leases of the network and power generation assets possibly generate 
large one-off transaction costs. Such costs may arise in the last two options. The textbox below 
elaborates on the issue of cross-border leases. Due to confidential information on these 
contracts, it is not possible to adequately predict the magnitude of these transaction costs. We 
only mention that, according to some experts, the current cross-border lease contracts may not 
need to be broken in the case of the ownership unbundling of the networks from the holdings. In 
some cases - when no substantial assets are to be unbundled - the respective transaction costs 
seems minor. However there is uncertainty for the cases in which substantial assets need to be 
unbundled. According to these experts, the issue might be solved by providing cross-guarantees 
between the current holdings (which are the parties that concluded the current cross-border 
lease contracts) and the companies/new holdings who will become the owners of the assets after 
the split. Notice that such a compromise implies no full financial ring fence. 
 
Also the transfer of the management of regional transmission networks, proposed by the 
Minister, does not necessarily require breaking of the cross-border lease contracts. However, 
 
41 In economic literature, the concept of transaction cost has a much broader meaning than the one-off cost of 
reorganisation addressed in this section. This concept refers to the trade off between contractual relationships and internal 
organisation. (See e.g. Joskow, 2003b.)    70 
here too, there is uncertainty regarding transaction costs in the case of voluntary sales of 
transmission assets to TenneT. 
Cross-border leases 
By means of cross-border leases (CBLs), assets can be leased to a foreign investor for an extensive period of time (the 
headlease) and leased back, for a lesser but still substantial period (the lease of sublease). There are mainly two types 
of CBLs to distinguish: a ‘lease-in-lease-out’, also called a Lilo, and a ‘sales-lease-back’. A Lilo has a relatively shorter 
headlease period of for example 50 years whereas a ‘sale-and-lease-back’ has a headlease period of 100 years or 
more. The lease back period is in both cases usually around 25 years. Because of such contracts, Lessors obtain a 
form of ownership of the assets as basis for fiscal depreciation reducing their taxable income. Lessees remain in full 
control of the assets during the lease-back period, obtain a realistic purchase-back option of the Lessors’ rights under 
the headlease once the lease-back period has ended, and immediately share in the financial tax benefits of the Lessor 
which can be used for other profitable investments.  
The first CBLs in the Dutch network industries date back to 1993, when Schiphol’s and the railway company’s assets 
were leased. In 1994, there was the first CBL on a power plant. In 1997, a gas distribution network was leased for the 
first time. Being the most complex network assets, electricity networks went the last. By that time, almost all less 
complex assets were already CB-leased. The first deal on electricity networks was done in 1999, i.e. after the first 
Electricity Act of 1998. Now the majority of electricity networks are leased, but not all of them. Most of the CBL contracts 
on network assets of electricity firms seem to be so-called ‘sale-lease back’ contracts. All these CBLs were implemented 
with  U.S.A.  investors  (Lessors)  because  of  fiscal  advantages  provided  by  the  American  tax  law.  In  2001  in  the 
Netherlands, the Department of Internal Affairs requested public authorities to refrain from further approval of new CBLs 
in public companies, mainly because it did not want to stimulate this kind of fiscal arbitrage. Since October 2004 new 
CBL contracts have been made unattractive by the new fiscal regulation of the American Jobs Creation Act. 
As the CBL-contracts of the energy industry are private contracts, information about the contents of these contracts is 
incomplete. Therefore, it is not possible to determine what the impact would be of changing the ownership structure of 
the industry on the contracts, and, hence, on costs for participants. We can only speculate on the size of the effects. 
It is not clear whether unbundling of distribution from supply necessarily means that the old CBL-contracts have to be 
broken. American investors seem not have strong incentives to break such contracts because of the fiscal advantages 
they derive from it. Otherwise, as the American tax law has changed recently, new CBLs have become little attractive. In 
principle, if the old contracts are broken, then new contracts are not attractive, as no profit is to be made anymore.  
In cases where a CBL is formally concluded by a network company itself, there should be no problem whatsoever. If the 
deal has been done by the holding and no substantial assets are unbundled (which holds for most companies), then 
also, no additional cost may occur. However, there is uncertainty regarding transaction costs in the case if substantial 
assets are to be unbundled.  
 
5.2.3  Other transitional costs 
In addition to the possible need for rearranging financial contracts, which in particular may be 
caused by the necessity to break the existing CBL contracts that we discussed above, there are 
also other transitional costs. These costs include the cost of the introduction of new ICT 
processes and program management, costs related to changes in personnel and housing, legal 
costs associated with implementing of a higher degree of unbundling, as well as costs 
associated with rearranging the other contracts of the companies with third parties. 
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Especially introduction of new ICT systems and restructuring the working process in the 
company may be costly. This is however one of the unavoidable costs associated with 
introduction of competition, since changes in technology are needed to accommodate more 
players in the energy market and to secure informational streams (we will discuss this also in 
the next section, when we address economies of scope). This means that substantial transitional 
cost arises already under the Legal-Fat option. 
 
Little evidence is available regarding the magnitude of these one-off costs. For example, 
according to OECD (2003) one-off transaction costs of breaking-up the integrated firm are 
significant in the telecommunications industry. However, there may be substantial differences 
in such costs across industries. As there is little international experience with ownership 
unbundling in electricity, it is difficult to evaluate these costs, although we observe a couple of 
voluntary unbundlings (in the United Kingdom). The latter suggests that the one-off costs 
associated with breaking the last link is may not be large. However, this does not include the 
effect of CBLs. Also, since ownership unbundling is a new development, which companies 
have not experienced before, it may be that it will increase uncertainty in the market during the 
transition period. 
5.2.4  Conclusion 
Except from the current situation, which is the status quo, each of the other three policy options 
imposes some transition cost. Especially introduction of new ICT systems and restructuring the 
working process in the company may be costly. Therefore, changing the allocation of tasks 
when shifting to the option Legal-Fat introduces a large reorganisation cost. Shifting to Legal-
Fat Plus may give rise to only little extra transaction costs compared to Legal-Fat, while the 
cost of shifting to ownership unbundling is larger. Both, legal and financial costs may arise in 
this option. In particular, there is uncertainty about the cost associated with cross-border leases. 
5.3  Loss of economies of scope 
5.3.1  Introduction 
In the electricity industry synergies between different activities could occur because of 
economies of scope. The latter exists if integration of different types of activities reduces 
average costs. We distinguish operational and financial synergy. Unbundling of network 
management from commercial activities and allocation of all strategic activities of the network 
to the network will reduce the options for combined activities and lead to losses of economies 
of scope.    72 
5.3.2  Operational synergy 
Let us first address the loss of economies of scope between the network and generation. Such 
scope economies exist where a company’s generation is located at the own network area, 
however, their positive effect is countervailed by possible negative effects of vertical 
integration on competition. In the Netherlands, main production units feed into the transmission 
level (i.e., at and above 110 kV). If, in accordance with the proposal of the Minister, the 
management of all the high-voltage grids will be transferred to TenneT, ownership unbundling 
will not yield further loss of economies of scope between network and such generation units. 
Small generation units feed into the distribution level. Many of such units are not co-owned by 
utility holdings. Therefore, in many cases, economies of scope that may arise from common 
ownership of such units and distribution networks have not been explored anyway.  
 
Economies of scope arise also between the network and supply activities. Common facilities 
such as call centres and billing machines are often mentioned as an example where synergies 
may arise. However, these are exactly the activities where exchange of commercially sensitive 
information may take place. Hence, also in the case of legal unbundling, ‘Chinese walls’ have 
to be established to separate the information stream of the network from that of commercial 
companies. Notice that maintaining ‘Chinese walls’ in not fully unbundled network and supply 
companies active in the same region whose profit-maximising incentives work in the same 
direction (as both want to maximise the overall profit) may be costly and ineffective, because of 
large information asymmetry between the company and the regulator.  
 
Even in the US-case, without these Chinese walls, Gilsdorf (1995) finds only insignificant 
economies of scope. After implementing legal unbundling and a proper division of tasks 
between the network and competitive activities, the additional losses of scope economies 
between the network and supply activities by introducing ownership unbundling are unlikely to 
be large in practice. 
 
In their advice to the Ministry of Economic Affairs of December 16, 2004, DTe lists the 
strategic activities that are desirable to be performed by a network operator itself, i.e. activities 
that should not be outsourced to commercial parties. The strategic activities are the following: 
 
·  Investment decisions regarding the extension and maintenance of the network; 
·  Operational management (e.g., dispatch, negotiations on contracts over the access to the 
network, and responsibility about information systems); 
·  Contracting of the parties that perform outsourced activities; 
·  Financial policy (setting up the annual reports, billing, contact with clients); 
·  Supervision of the design of new and maintained networks; 
·  Management of information systems.   73 
This list contains all the activities that have to do with processing customer information. Such a 
division of tasks is implemented under all policy options defined in Chapter 1, except the 
current one, called Legal-Lean. Therefore, any of the three options implementing the proper 
allocation of the tasks of companies gives rise to the respective cost. If such rules are 
implemented, ownership unbundling leads to some additional loss of economies of scope. These 
additional costs follow from the removal of all remaining shared facilities, such as a common 
name, and shared activities, such as shared purchase of non-strategic products and shared 
contracts with, for instance, lawyers. After all, in the ownership option, all relationships 
between network firm and holding are removed. 
 
We conclude that the loss of operational synergies occurs mainly between the central generation 
and transmission and between the network and retail. However, the choice for liberalisation of 
the electricity market exactly implies removing these economies of scope to a large degree, also 
under legal unbundling. Therefore, when comparing the four policy options, the main cost of 
losing economies of scope arises with introducing a proper task allocation when moving from 
Legal-Lean to Legal-Fat. The cost stays almost the same if we go further to Legal-Fat Plus. 
Additionally, ownership unbundling adds only small extra cost. 
5.3.3  Financial synergy 
Financial synergies (which is just another term for financial cross-subsidies) may be also 
sometimes seen as a form of economies of scope. An integrated firm has an advantage as it 
benefits from lower interest rates compared to the competitors. One may, however, wonder how 
these benefits of lower interest rates of an integrated firm come about. Using network assets as 
a base for non-network debts implies that shareholders of the network pay for the higher credit 
rating of the holding, by bearing higher risks on their future dividends from the network. 
Lower interest rates on debts are unlikely to be passed on to customers for two reasons. First, as 
shareholders of the company pay for these lower rates through increased risk on their dividends, 
they are likely to demand a higher return on capital, thus offsetting the initial advantage. 
Secondly, the cost advantage is not available to all players in the market, as it is linked to 
owning a network. Firms without a network do not have access to the advantage, and can not 
gain access to this advantage either. It is a general feature of oligopoly markets that firms with 
exclusive cost advantages will not pass these advantages on to consumers, but transfer them 
into rents. From these considerations, we conclude that economies of scope that are associated 
with financial synergies are unlikely to be welfare improving. 
 
5.3.4  Conclusion 
We conclude that there are some economies of scope between the network and commercial 
businesses exploring which may be welfare improving. This positive effect on welfare is mainly   74 
due to the production technology in the electricity sector, which exhibits economies of scope, 
and the need for coordination of the actions of market participants, rather than due to financial 
synergies. When comparing the four policy options with respect to operational economies of 
scope, the main loss of such economies of scope arises after introducing a proper task allocation 
when moving from Legal-Lean to Legal-Fat. The cost stays almost the same if we go further to 
Legal-Fat Plus. Additionally, ownership unbundling adds only small extra cost.  
 
As we have noticed above, the effect of financial synergy is mainly allocative and not on total 
welfare. There is however one related issue: eliminating financial synergies may increase the 
risk of insufficient investment in generation, which we discuss in the next section. 
5.4  Increased risk of insufficient investments in generation 
5.4.1  Introduction 
Theoretically, unbundling could affect risks for commercial parts of holdings in two ways. The 
first one is higher costs of capital. Unbundling could weaken the financial base of Dutch 
utilities, which may adversely impact their investment in generation. The second one is the 
reduced role of long-term contracts, also negatively affecting investment in generation. Both 
arguments relate to financing capabilities, namely to the possibility to use the network as a 
collateral. The current law already prohibits this for new financial contracts of the holdings. In 
this respect all three options that feature legal unbundling are equivalent. The Ownership option 
separates financing fully. Therefore, the risks are higher in this option. How serious are these 
risks? To which extent does the argument hold that unbundling financially weakens Dutch 
energy companies and, hence, reduces investments in generation capacity? 
5.4.2  Cost of capital and investments 
In a vertically integrated firm, the combined risk of all activities could be lower than the risk of 
some specific activities, notably commercial activities, due to the relatively low risks associated 
with network management. Firms active in generation and/or supply who do not have a network 
face a larger probability of bankruptcy. Hence, such companies have, ceteris paribus, a higher 
cost of capital than integrated firms. In other words, unbundling would reduce the financing 
capabilities of commercial firms and, hence, reduce investments. 
 
On the other side, if this significantly affects profitability, electricity-producing companies or 
supply companies may (and will) solve it by merging with other companies, in particular those 
active in less risky sectors or having network assets in other countries. For example, they may 
acquire a distribution company in another country or industry. If the market is sufficiently 
competitive, the companies will converge to the optimal structure in the long run. 
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The upstream level has already shown a process of consolidation of generating firms on the 
European level for several years. This process could be enhanced if firms were split from 
network firms. As a result, the number of players on the upstream level could reduce after 
splitting. Whether this would negatively affect competition is an issue subject to competition 
policy. Over and above, the question is whether the existence of vertically integrated firms 
would effectively countervail the on-going consolidation in the European power industry which 
may form a threat for achieving allocative efficiency in the electricity market. Such risks are 
always present. Competition policy measures, such as European merger control, seem to be far 
more appropriate to deal with these risks. 
 
5.4.3  Long-term contracts and investments 
In electricity, there is a concern that when supply activities compete with each other, risks on 
the upstream side, i.e. on the side of generation, may increase. The source of this additional risk 
is the reduced role of long-term contracts in the retail market. With less long-term contracting, 
generators facing higher risks would invest less, possibly resulting in underinvestment in 
production capacity.  
 
Green (2003) argues that retail competition might lead to less long-term contracting and to 
higher prices. If electricity retailers face competition, then companies signing long-term 
contracts are exposed to the risk that a fall in short-term prices would allow their rivals to buy 
on the spot market and undercut them. This will result in less contracting. This argument holds 
for both separate and integrated companies, and relates to the introduction of retail competition 
rather than unbundling. In practice, both integrated and non-integrated companies have only 
relatively short-term contracts. 
 
5.4.4  Investments in power plants 
As said, the ability of Dutch utilities to invest in generation may reduce after ownership 
unbundling. However, the reduction in investment of these particular companies may be 
temporary, as they can improve their investment position by merging with other companies who 
may have investment capabilities. Furthermore, it is not obvious why such investment should 
necessarily be financed from the Dutch networks, as Dutch regional utilities are not the only 
investors in this market. 
 
Table 5.1 provides some insight in the ownership of the top five producers in the Netherlands, 
who own 78% of total capacity, including all the large plants (with a very minor exception: as 
AES, an American corporation, partly owns one of the large plants).
42 Three of the five largest 
producers are vertically integrated Dutch utilities. They cover about 45% of the Dutch 
production. The other two, with the respective share of about 30%, are large foreign utilities. 
 
42 Unfortunately, the picture is incomplete, as we do not have information on other companies.   76 
They have electricity networks in other countries. The remainder of the capacity consists of 
small generation units. Investment in such units is mainly done by industrial players (such as, 
paper producers or oil refineries), i.e. by companies without network assets. Therefore, not only 
the Dutch regional utility holdings invest in production in the Netherlands.  
 
The amount of generation investment is determined by the future price for energy and the 
average costs of producing electricity. If access to the grid is guaranteed, new firms may enter 
the generation market if investment becomes economically attractive. This implies that the 
network does not and should not play an important role in financing generation investments. 
Higher levels of investments due to network-based lower capital costs may even be labelled 
overinvestment, as it is partly financed from other sources than the investment itself. 
 
Related to this, we would like to touch upon the argument that is often mentioned, which is 
often put forward by the Dutch companies regarding the possible loss of work opportunities in 
the Netherlands after unbundling because of the closed head offices, no need for electricity 
production in the Netherlands, and smaller supply offices. See, e.g., the recent article by several 
leaders of the Dutch unions in ‘Het Financieele Dagblad’, where they argue that ownership 
unbundling will result in the loss of 14,000 -21,000 jobs in the industry.
43 This argument seems 
to boil down to ‘no need to produce electricity in the Netherlands’. Although there indeed exists 
a ‘home-bias’ phenomenon for investment (it is often easier to invest in your home-country than 
abroad), the main motivation for investment in generation is not the location of the head-office, 
but the expected return on such an investment. Hence, investment in generation in the 
Netherlands will occur when the return on such investment is sufficient. 
Table 5.1  Market shares of the five largest producers 




Share of production 
capacity of the five 
large producers in the 
total capacity in the 
Netherlands 
     
  (in MW)  (in %) 
     
Essent  4700  22,8 
Electrabel  4692  22,8 
Nuon  4296  20,9 
E.ON Benelux  1770  8,6 
Delta  715  3,5 
Total  16173  78,5 
     
Source: Energie Nederland Special (April 2003) and own computation. The percentage 78,5% in the last row is computed based on the 
data from Statline (CBS, 2002), according to which the total production capacity in the Netherlands is about 20601MW. 
 
43 FD, 08-04-2005: “Voorzichtig met energiebedrijven!” by L. de Waal, D. Terpstra, A. Verhoeven and J. de Jong.   77 
5.4.5  Conclusion 
We conclude, except for ownership unbundling the other three options are equivalent with 
respect to the effect on generation investment. The Ownership option may indeed reduce 
investment in generation by the currently integrated Dutch utility holdings. However, other 
parties will still be willing to invest as long as the expected returns are sufficiently high. In such 
a case, the risk of insufficient generation investment does not increase much.   78   79 
6  Assessing the trade-offs between costs and benefits 
6.1  Introduction 
As said in the introductory chapter, we focus on describing the trade-offs of different effects of 
several options to unbundle the energy distribution industry. In chapters 4 and 5 we have 
analysed benefits and costs of unbundling, respectively. Unbundling network activities from 
commercial activities contributes to a clear division between them. It increases the 
independence of network companies as well as the effectiveness of regulation, and may be an 
effective measure to increase competition. Furthermore, it opens opportunities to privatise 
commercial activities. Besides these benefits, we have distinguished the following costs: 
transaction costs, loss of economies of scope, and the risk of insufficient investments in 
generation. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the results. In this chapter we compare the four 
policy options with each other, beginning with the current structure of the energy distribution 
industry. In the final section of this chapter, we pay attention to the relationship between 
unbundling and reliability of the supply of electricity. 
6.2  Current structure 
The trade-offs related to the current structure (Legal-Lean) are not depicted in table 6.1, as this 
structure is used as benchmark to assess the effects of the other three options. According to the 
proposal of the Minister, the current structure delivers insufficient competition between 
suppliers, insufficient independence of network management and insufficient transparency 
regarding the activities of the integrated firms. Given the political ambition to liberalise energy 
markets, further unbundling seems to be appropriate. There is evidence that unbundling 
contributes to better competition in the market and that more competition leads to lower prices. 
As there is no quantitative information regarding the exact relationship between the degree of 
unbundling and the degree of competition in the market, the question remains to which extent 
network activities and commercial activities should be separated.  
6.3  Legal-Lean versus Legal-Fat 
One difference between the Legal-Lean structure and the Legal-Fat structure, is that the step 
towards the latter increases independency of network managers and raises transparency of all 
the different activities of the integrated firm, thus increasing both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of network regulation. These are clear benefits of this option for structuring the 
energy distribution industry.  
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Note that in price regulation, DTe already treats network companies as economic owners of 
their assets, and takes the corresponding capital cost into account when setting prices for 
network services. Moving the economic ownership of the assets to the network companies - 
i.e., a shift from ‘lean’ to ‘fat’ - seems to be a logic step, formalising this and giving the 
regulator a better view on the network companies’ costs. 
Table 6.1  Costs and benefits of unbundling: improvement/decrease in total welfare under the alternative 
policy options as compared to Legal-Lean 
  Legal-Fat 
(Legal unbundling 
with ‘Fat’ networks+ 
 task allocation)  
Legal-Fat Plus 
(Legal unbundling 
with ‘Fat’ networks+ 
task allocation+ 





proposed by the 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs) 
Benefits       
a. Performance of networks:       
       Better focus and more secure financing  Improvement  Larger Improvement   Even larger 
improvement 
       Economies of scale   No change  No change  Depends on scenario 
       
b. Effectiveness and efficiency of regulation  Improvement  Improvement  Larger improvement 
       
c. Degree of competition:       
       In retail  Small improvement 
with modest welfare 
effects 
Small improvement 
with modest welfare 
effects 
Small improvement 
with modest welfare 
effects 
       In generation  Improvement  Improvement  Larger Improvement 
       
d. Benefits of privatisation  No change   No change   Improvement 
       
Costs       
a. Transaction costs       
      Cross-border leases  Uncertainty, likely no 
effect 
Uncertainty, but risk of 
large costs 
Uncertainty, but risk of 
large costs 
      Other costs  Welfare decrease  Welfare decrease  Larger welfare 
decrease 
b. Loss of economies of scope:       
      Operational  Welfare decrease  Welfare decrease   Larger welfare 
decrease 
      Financial  No change  No change  No change 
       
c. Less investments in generation   No change  No change  Unlikely to change 
     
 
Secondly, compared to the Legal-Lean structure, the Legal-Fat structure levels the playing field 
for all suppliers and may stimulate entry both in retail and in generation. In the case of retail, 
entry leads to increased competition, lowering end-user prices. As the decrease in end-user 
prices takes the form of lower standing charges (Lijesen, 2002), this will merely redistribute 
wealth from retailers to consumers, rather than increase the level of wealth. In the longer run, 
increased competition between retailers may increase their efficiency, but given the cost share   81 
of retail in the end-user price of energy, welfare gains are likely to be modest. For generation, 
per unit prices are affected, leaving much more room for welfare increases. Furthermore, 
gaming in generation may lead to considerable welfare losses, so that a decrease in the scope 
for gaming may increase welfare substantially. These benefits are (partly) achieved by applying 
the Legal-Fat structure, which is a stronger unbundling form than Legal-Lean. 
 
Going from the Legal-Lean structure to the Legal-Fat structure also gives rise to costs. Making 
the network owner fat gives rise to one-off transition costs. Furthermore, due to the extended 
operational separation between network and supply, loss of economies of scope occurs.  
6.4  Legal-Fat versus Legal-Fat Plus 
Compared to the Legal-Fat structure, the Legal-Fat Plus structure would mainly affect the 
independence of network financing. Note from the table that these options are very similar in 
terms of costs and benefits. In the Legal-Fat Plus option, the management of networks will have 
increased means, as the credit rating based on network assets is now fully available for the 
network itself. On the negative side, giving the network more financial independence imposes 
some risk on old financial contracts of the holdings, such as CBL contracts. However, there is 
uncertainty regarding the latter effect. 
6.5  Ownership versus Legal-Fat Plus 
The Ownership structure alters several categories of benefits and costs compared to the Legal-
Fat structure. The entirely independent status following from full ownership unbundling will 
further improve the management of networks, as network firms will now no longer be 
compromising between the interests of the network and other activities. Furthermore, depending 
on the scenario with respect to regional transmission, full unbundling may facilitate horizontal 
mergers at the transmission level, which may give rise to economies of scale. 
 
A further benefit of unbundling is that it eases network regulation greatly, especially since the 
network firm no longer has an incentive to influence downstream competition. This implies that 
network regulation will become both more effective and more efficient. 
 
Competition in retail or generation is further facilitated, as cross-subsidies are now fully 
impossible and the incentive for all forms of anti-competitive behaviour is taken away. Note 
that, as said before, welfare effects from competition in generation are likely to be larger than 
welfare effects from competition in retail. The net effect of entry and consolidation in the case 
of ownership unbundling depends on the current market structure. As discussed before, the 
Dutch supply market is already highly concentrated. It must be questioned whether ownership   82 
unbundling would result in further concentration due to consolidation. Other measures, notably 
directed at tackling mergers and concentration, would be needed to prevent this outcome.  
 
A benefit which (under the current governance structure) can be achieved by ownership 
unbundling is the possibility to privatise commercial activities while keeping network firms in 
public hands. If this option is highly valued, ownership unbundling seems to be the appropriate 
choice.
44 The increased transparency following from the unbundling attracts more focused 
shareholders for both parts of the firm, thus increasing the value of the firm to shareholders. 
Moreover, privatisation of the commercial activities increases shareholder pressure to raise 
efficiency. 
 
The costs of the Ownership option, compared to the Legal-Fat Plus are an increase in the loss of 
economies of scope and higher transitional costs. Furthermore, investment in generation my be 
affected. The loss of economies of scope is fairly small, due to the regulations already in place 
in all of the options in the table. The order of magnitude of transitional costs mainly depends on 
the risk of dissolving the current CBL contracts of some companies. As the box on cross-border 
leases in section 5.2 suggests, there is uncertainty regarding these costs. Regarding the 
generation investment, the effect is likely to be small and temporary. 
 
How does this option compare to the Legal-Fat Plus option? From the above, it is clear that at 
least one of the cost elements (loss of economies of scope) is probably fairly small, whereas the 
benefits are larger than in the Legal-Fat Plus case. The final judgement of the step of full 
ownership unbundling is ambiguous however, as it depends on how one weighs the costs 
against the benefits.  
6.6  Unbundling and reliability 
So far we have mostly focused on financial costs and benefits associated with different 
unbundling options; in this section we would like to explicitly address the respective effects on 
reliability. We notice that reliability of energy supply can be affected either on the production 
side (sufficient production capacity) or on the network side (proper operation, maintenance and 
investment in the network). When analysing the costs and benefits in the previous two chapters, 
we highlighted several aspects that relate to reliability of supply, such as the effect of the 
increased independence of network companies on their performance, the effect of regulation, 
 
44 However, if shareholders would have more influence on decisions on the current distribution firms, as result of another 
governance structure, some firms would split voluntary.   83 
possible hold up of investment in network, and financial risks for generation and supply. We 
give more explanation on each of these points below. 
·  Increased independency of network management and financing is good for reliability. Splitting 
the network companies from the holdings provides the independence of operational and 
investment decisions and ensures that all the decisions of the network are taken in its best 
interests. Splitting financial responsibilities fully eliminates the risk of cash lock up, which 
guarantees that the network has enough means to maintain good reliability. Unbundling 
financial capabilities of the network and the commercial activities of the holdings eliminates the 
risk of cash lock up for the network. This is the advantage of the options Legal-Fat Plus and 
Ownership unbundling. 
·  The more transparent the information on costs of network companies, the better the regulator 
will be able to create proper incentives to networks by regulation. Reliability is already included 
in the regulation model. The way the network companies are rewarded and fined for changes in 
reliability determines their incentives regarding reliability. This seems to hold under any form 
of unbundling.  
·  In general, regulation is supposed to ensure that there is no hold up of network investment. Still 
there may be some situation when it is difficult for the regulator to get insight regarding the 
efficiency of some specific investments. In particular, network investment can sometimes be a 
substitute for production capacity. An unbundled network firm may be reluctant to do such 
investment. In this vein, integrated companies may have better incentives for optimising 
reliability. Notice however, that this problem is particularly relevant for transmission networks, 
which perform the interconnection function, while there are fewer substitution possibilities 
between generation and distribution. According to the proposal of the Minister the management 
of transmission networks will be transferred to the national TSO TenneT, which provides the 
possibility to optimise the transmission grid and to coordinate production. 
·  Unbundling financial capabilities of the network and commercial activities increases risks for 
commercial activities, which may lead to a reduction of investment in generation by the Dutch 
energy holdings. However, as we have already explained in chapter 5, this does not have to be 
permanent as they may merge with other companies who have capital assets, and as there are 
also other investors in this market. 
 
Summarising, unbundling has different types of effects on reliability. Some effects are positive, 
notably the enhanced independence and the focus of network management and improved 
efficacy of regulation. Other ones, however, could negatively affect reliability, notably an 
increased risk of hold up of network investment and an increased risk of insufficient investment 
in generators. 
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7  Conclusions 
7.1  Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, we analysed the effects of several options to restructure the Dutch 
energy distribution sector. This chapter presents the main conclusions from this analysis, 
starting with a description of the scope of our research and ending with general lessons for 
solving this kind of policy issues. 
Scope of our research 
Changing the ownership structure of an industry can have far-reaching consequences, so that a 
thorough analysis of costs and benefits of such a measure is necessary. Therefore, we have 
conducted a research into the consequences of the proposal recently put forward by the Dutch 
government to introduce ownership separation between energy distribution on the one hand, 
and production and retail on the other. We provide a systematic overview of the costs and 
benefits of this policy measure. This overview is of a highly qualitative nature because these 
types of restructuring measures are inherently hard to assess. The analysis of the effects is 
mainly based on theoretical reasoning and some evidence from other countries. Moreover, we 
focus on the electricity industry, even though the unbundling proposal of the government also 
includes distribution of natural gas.  
Options to restructure the electricity industry 
Although the policy debate on unbundling of the energy distribution industry has been directed 
at ownership unbundling, we define two alternative forms of unbundling. Compared to the 
current structure, which we call Legal-Lean, both of the two alternatives increase separation 
between infrastructure and commercial activities, but do not involve ownership unbundling. In 
the first alternative, called Legal-Fat, all strategic network activities are allocated to the network 
firm which also has the economic ownership of the network assets. In the second alternative, 
called Legal-Fat Plus, financial ring fencing is added, implying that the financing capacities of 
the network firm are protected. In this option, the network firm is still part of the holding while 
the holding is able to influence the management of the network firm. 
Categories of benefits and costs 
We define four mutually-related benefit categories: performance of networks, effectiveness and 
efficiency of regulation, degree of competition, and benefits of privatisation of commercial 
activities. As there is no free lunch, unbundling also introduces costs. We distinguish 
transaction costs, loss of economies of scope and the risk of less investment in generation. As it 
is inherently difficult to quantify effects of the policy measures considered, we provide a   86 
qualitative comparison of the four policy options for each separate cost and benefit category. In 
addition, we assess the trade-offs between costs and benefits that arise in each option. 
7.2  Benefits of unbundling 
Unbundling enhances independent network management 
Unbundling creates a more independent position of the network, which provides benefits for the 
network performance through a better focus on the objectives of the network and a better 
response to regulatory incentives. Furthermore, unbundling networks from other activities may 
have a positive effect if it leads to achieving scale economies in network management. Here we 
compare the four alternative options with respect to these two effects. 
 
As explained, more independence is beneficial for the performance of the network. In the 
Legal-Lean situation, which is our benchmark, networks are the least independent, as they even 
do not have economic ownership of their assets. Making networks ‘fat’ creates more 
transparency with respect to the network firms’ assets. This and a proper allocation of the 
strategic tasks will decrease the interference with the holdings and secure a better performance 
of the network. From this perspective, the option Legal-Fat is better than Legal-Lean; and the 
option Legal-Fat Plus is even better as it decreases the risk of insufficient financing. The option 
of ownership unbundling improves on Legal-Fat Plus by removing the last distortions and 
focuses the performance of network companies on their objectives the best. 
 
Regarding the possibility to realise economies of scale, we conclude that this possibility is 
mainly important for transmission. Therefore, the four options are equivalent with respect to 
this benefit, as long as the proposal of the Minister on merging the management of transmission 
lines goes through. Otherwise, the ownership unbundling option may have a larger benefit than 
the other options, as it increases the chance of merging regional transmission networks with 
TenneT in the future. 
Unbundling improves effectiveness and efficiency of regulation 
We distinguish two effects of unbundling on regulation: effect on incentive regulation and 
effect on the market surveillance task of the regulator. More unbundling is beneficial for both. 
The Legal-Fat as well as the Legal-Fat Plus options have higher benefits than the Legal-Lean 
option, because they introduce a proper task allocation, and hence eliminate a great deal of 
possible cross-subsidies and interference between the network and commercial divisions of the 
holding. Still, the largest improvement can be achieved only in the Ownership option, since it 
removes last cross-subsidies and personal links. The surveillance task of the regulator becomes 
much easier, as networks have no incentives to favour or disadvantage any competing company.   87 
Unbundling enhances retail competition but welfare effects are probably small 
Unbundling is likely to promote entry in retail. Although the net welfare gains achieved in the 
retail market may be limited, unbundling may tackle a potential tight oligopoly in this market. If 
unbundling results in increased competition, the welfare effects would probably be small as 
competitors in the retail industry compete by two-part tariffs. An increase in the number of 
traders likely reduces standing charges, resulting in redistribution of welfare towards 
consumers, but does not affect commodity prices. Furthermore, retail costs and margins form a 
small portion of total costs of electricity, thus limiting the potential effects of increased retail 
competition on welfare and distribution. Model analysis shows that an increase of the number 
of retailers from 3 to 4, for instance, leads to a decrease of the standing charge of approximately 
14%, boiling down to 1 percent of total electricity expenditure for an average household.  
 
The impact of unbundling on further consolidation in the Dutch retail market is probably 
negligible because of the currently high level of concentration. This threat of increased 
consolidation is likely to be dealt with by the competition authority.  
Unbundling could significantly affect wholesale competition 
The impact on competition in the market for generation depends on three factors: control over 
the transmission grid by the distribution companies, future development of small-scale 
generation, and development of the North-Western European power market. If the transmission 
grid as from 110 kV will be separated from the distribution companies, as the Dutch 
government also has proposed, then further unbundling will hardly have any effect on 
competition on the market for large-scale generation. After all, the large-scale power plants are 
connected to the transmission grid, not to the distribution grid. Otherwise, the form of 
unbundling of the distribution firms seriously impacts the playing field between producers 
having a grid and producers not having a grid.  
 
In addition, unbundling could also substantially affect the competitiveness of small-scale 
generators connected to the distribution network. The importance of this aspect will grow if the 
role of small-scale generation rises, which will be the case according to some electricity experts. 
In such a scenario, the role of the distribution network will be comparable to that of the current 
transmission network, which is an essential factor in offering equal access to generators, 
providing a strong argument in favour of ownership unbundling of the current distribution 
network.  
 
The third factor to be mentioned here is the possible impact of unbundling on the degree of 
competition on the North-Western European power market. This market has shown a tendency 
of growing horizontal concentration. Separation of Dutch power plants from the respective 
network companies does, however, not necessarily imply that they all will be purchased by one   88 
of the current dominant players in this market, resulting in an even higher level of 
concentration. In the broader European market, we see several other potential buyers of the 
Dutch generation plants after the implementation of ownership unbundling. Consequently, the 
effect of unbundling on the degree of competition on the European market is likely small. 
Ownership unbundling creates a possibility to privatise commercial activities 
Currently, public authorities own the vertically integrated energy distribution firms. As a result, 
commercial activities, i.e. generation and supply, are conducted by firms in public hands. For 
public authorities, this structure might result in politically unwanted situations, such as 
commercial, risky ventures conducted by publicly-owned firms. Ownership unbundling 
separates network and commercial activities; and enables (public) shareholders to sell their 
shares in the commercial firms, while retaining the shares in the network firm. Privatising 
commercial activities generates a more clear distinction  between the role of the government 
and activities of market parties in the liberalised part of the industry. Under the current 
corporate governance structure, this benefit can only be achieved by ownership unbundling, 
although the integrated firms could always sell parts of their holding voluntarily. If the public 
shareholders would now sell the commercial parts, they need the consent of the management of 
the holding. 
 
Selling commercial activities of the energy holdings to private parties could generate an 
additional benefit, notably making these firms more sensitive to pressure from shareholders. In 
the current situation, the public shareholders hardly give incentives to the management of the 
holdings to improve efficiency. Privatisation of commercial parts would, in other words, raise 
efficiency.  
7.3  Costs of unbundling 
Unbundling gives rise to one-off transaction costs 
As unbundling involves a change in the structure of the industry, one-off transaction costs will 
occur. The improvement of legal unbundling would already give rise to some of these costs, as 
several alterations would have to be implemented. Both, Legal-Fat Plus and Ownership 
unbundling give rise to additional one-off transactions costs, in particular costs following from 
changing the cross-border leases. There is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of these costs, 
due to confidential information about the current contracts and uncertainty regarding the 
possible reaction of American investors to unbundling.  
Unbundling leads to loss of economies of scope 
Vertical integration of network management and supply generates positive economies of scope 
as some activities, such as call centres and billing, can be jointly conducted. Separating network   89 
from supply, therefore, leads to loss of economies of scope. The respective costs already follow 
from implementing a stronger form of legal unbundling. Ownership unbundling raises the loss 
of economies of scope as also common use of non-strategic facilities, such as contracts with 
suppliers of office supplies, have to be cancelled. The magnitude of the additional loss of 
economies of scope due to ownership unbundling is likely to be fairly small as legal unbundling 
already separates most common activities. 
Unbundling could temporarily affect investments in generation 
The stronger the unbundling, the less investment in generation can be financed by using the 
network firm, directly or indirectly (as collateral) as a source of financial means. Consequently, 
unbundling could affect the financial ability of the (currently) vertically integrated incumbent 
firms to invest in generation. This effect is likely to be relatively small and temporary. More 
than 50% of all generation capacity is owned by other parties than the vertically integrated 
firms. As a result, total investment in power plants depends on far more factors than the 
financing capacities of the integrated firms.  
Conclusion on ownership unbundling 
Ownership unbundling likely has a number of benefits but also features the risk of high 
transaction costs.  
 
·  Ownership unbundling strongly increases independence of network management, fostering the 
focus of network companies on their direct activities. This encourages investment and 
innovations in the grid and hence reduces the risk of insufficient investment in networks.  
·  This effect is related to the improved effectiveness of regulation, enabling the regulator to 
acquire adequate information needed to determine appropriate access charges. Related to this, 
ownership unbundling increases efficiency of regulatory activity as the regulated parties have 
less incentives to strategically relocate costs and benefits and affect competition in the market.  
·  Ownership unbundling facilitates competitions in retail by tackling the potential tight oligopoly 
in this market, but total welfare would be hardly affected by this.  
·  The impact of ownership unbundling on welfare is higher if it facilitates competition in the 
wholesale market which mainly depends on the future development of small-scale generation 
and separation of the transmission grid. 
·  Furthermore, ownership unbundling enables privatisation of commercial activities, making 
them more sensitive to shareholder pressure to increase efficiency and giving current public 
shareholders the option to withdraw their capital from commercial activities. 
·  This generates a more clear distinction between the role of the government and activities of 
market parties in the liberalised part of the industry.  
·  The realisation of these results is, of course, not a free lunch. Ownership unbundling reduces 
economies of scope and, furthermore, creates one-off transaction costs. There is uncertainty   90 
about the size of the one-off transaction costs caused by the impact of unbundling on the current 
cross-border leases. 
·  Unbundling may also affect investments in generation by the currently vertically integrated 
Dutch utility holdings, but this is unlikely to affect overall investments in power plants. 
 
Mainly because of the uncertainty about the future role of small-scale generation and the 
uncertainty about the magnitude of the transaction costs related to the cross-border leases, the 
net effect on welfare of ownership unbundling is ambiguous. 
 
Ownership unbundling is not the only option to realise some of the benefits mentioned above. 
By fierce regulatory surveillance and competition policy, competition in the retail market can be 
improved. Moreover, changing the corporate governance structure can give (public) 
shareholders the option to withdraw from risky, commercial activities. As in that case 
shareholders have information on the magnitude of the transaction costs they incur by 
unbundling a specific utility, voluntary unbundling will take place where it is efficient. 
7.4  Final remarks 
General lessons 
When considering unbundling of a vertically integrated firm, policy makers face at least four 
problems. First, it is always hard to quantify benefits. Sometimes one can lean from foreign 
experiences, but in the absence of useful comparisons one has to rely on theoretical arguments, 
expert judgement and educated guesses. This may seem unsatisfactory, in particular for the 
parties involved, but one can not do better. Second, even if direct benefits of unbundling seem 
to outweigh costs, the policy maker has to assess if he wants to incur the transaction costs and 
risks associated with (radical) changes. These costs are also difficult to assess, in particular the 
risk part. Third, both on the cost side as well as on the benefit side, there are elements of 
political judgement. For instance, ownership unbundling creates an optimal platform for 
keeping the distribution in public hands, providing an extra argument for unbundling if the 
political forces favour public ownership of electricity distribution networks. Fourth, these kinds 
of changes often require trading off long and short term. Unbundling seems only wise if it 
creates the best market outlay in the long run. In the short run, economic (transaction) and 
political (fierce lobbying, impatience) costs need to be incurred.  
 
Our conclusions on benefits and costs of ownership unbundling should thus be interpreted in the 
context of these four problems. 
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Other factors which should be taken into account 
Besides the benefits and costs considered above, other factors should be taken into account.  
One factor is the impact of the decision on unbundling on future freedom to change policies. 
Contrary to the legal-unbundling options, ownership unbundling is a radical measure. The 
uncertainty regarding the welfare effect suggests the alternative of postponing the decision on 
unbundling in order to wait for more information, in particular on the development of small-
scale generation and the degree to which it is encouraged or hindered by the currently legally 
unbundled distribution networks. 
 
A comparable ‘wait and see attitude’ is now adopted by several states in the United States 
regarding introducing competition in the electricity industry, waiting for more evidence on 
effects of restructuring the electricity industry in states running at the forefront in this process. 
According to Joskow (2003a), experts do not agree on the most appropriate way for proceeding 
with structural and institution reforms. An additional argument for this attitude follows from the 
European perspective. None of the other EU-members has already introduced ownership 
unbundling or is now considering doing so. These are arguments in favour of maintaining or 
improving legal unbundling possibly in combination with other policy measures improving 
independence of network management, such as increasing the power of shareholders and 
improving regulation and competition policy. 
 
On the other hand, waiting to decide creates uncertainty about the future institutional design. 
This could cause a hold-up problem: private firms delaying investment decisions because of the 
risk that the government will alter conditions affecting profitability of these investments in the 
future. This is an argument in favour of ownership unbundling, as that decision would strongly 
reduce uncertainty. However, uncertainty would also be reduced by legislation determining the 
legal structure for a long period of time. 
 
Another factor which should be taken into account is the relationship between unbundling and 
privatisation. If the government were to choose for legal unbundling and subsequently privatise 
the vertically integrated companies, it loses the chance to split privatised companies in the 
future if such a measure appears necessary. In addition, given the reservations of the politicians 
regarding privatisation of the infrastructure, improving legal unbundling instead of imposing 
ownership unbundling hinders the possibilities to privatise commercial activities. This is also an 
argument in favour of ownership unbundling. However, improving the corporate governance 
structure can give the current public shareholders the power to sell commercial businesses of 
the utility holdings. 
 
From these considerations, another route regarding the utility industry might be an option. This 
route consists of improving the current legal unbundling structure and improving the corporate   92 
governance structure. When these measures appear not to be sufficient for the development of 
small-scale generation and the privatisation of commercial activities, ownership unbundling is 
the logical next step. 
   93 
References 
Ackermann, T. G. Andersson and L. Söder, 2001, Distributed generation: a definition, Electric 
Power Systems Research, 57, pp. 195-204. 
 
Armstrong, M., C. Doyle and J. Vickers, 1996, The access pricing problem: a synthesis, The 
Journal of Industrial Economics vol. XLIV, pp. 131-50. 
 
Awerbuch, S. and A. Preston (eds.), 1996, The Virtual Utility, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston. 
 
Baumol, W.J., J.A. Ordover and R.D. Willig, 1997, Parity pricing and its critics: A necessary 
condition for efficiency in the provision of bottleneck services to competitors, Yale Journal on 
Regulation vol. 14, pp. 145-63. 
 
Beard, T.R., D.L. Kaserman and J.W. Mayo, 2001, Regulation, vertical integration and 
sabotage, The Journal of Industrial Economics vol. XLIX(3) pp.319-33 
 
Bijl, P. de, 2004, Structural Separation and Access in Telecommunications Markets, TILEC 
Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, DP 2004-011. 
 
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, 2003, Rail Infrastructure Pricing: principles and 
practice, Report 109. 
 
Burkart, M., D. Gromb and F. Panunzi et al., 1997, Large shareholders, monitoring and the 
value of the firm, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 693-728. 
 
Canoy, M. and S. Onderstal, 2003, Tight Oligopolies; In search of Proportionate Remedies, 
CPB, The Hague. 
Cate, A ten, and M.G. Lijesen, 2004, The Elmar model: output and capacity in imperfectly 
competitive electricity markets, CPB Memorandum 94. 
CBS, 2005, Productie Middelen Elektriciteit 2002, http://statline.cbs.nl. 
 
CPB, 1997, Challenging Neighbours; Rethinking German and Dutch Economic Institutions, 
Springer Verlag, Berlin - Heidelberg. 
   94 
CPB and OCFEB/SEOR-ECRi, 2004, Better safe than sorry, Reliability policy in network 
industries. CPB Document 73. The Hague. 
 
Connor P. and C. Mitchell, 2002, A Review of Four European Regulatory Systems and Their 
Impact on the Deployment of Distributed Generation, University of Warwick. 
http://www.sustelnet.net/docs/wp2/wp2_final_report.pdf  
 
Damme, E. van, and A. Kanning, Opsplitsing van regionale energiebedrijven: Onderzoek voor 
de Provincie Noord-Brabant, Universiteit van Tilburg, April 28, 2004. 
Damme, E. van, and G. Zwart, 2003, The liberalised Dutch green electricity market: lessons 
from a policy experiment, De Economist, 151(4), 389-413.  
Danish Electricity Supply Statistical Survey 2003.  
 
Denis, D.J., D.K. Denise and A. Sarin, 1997, Agency problems, equity ownership, and 
corporate diversification, Journal of Finance 52(1), pp 135-60. 
Domah, P. and M. Pollitt, 2000, The Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution 
and Supply Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost Benefit Analysis, Cambridge 
Working Papers in Economics 0007, Department of Applied Economics, University of 
Cambridge. Cambridge, UK.  
 
DTe, 2004a, Advies onafhankelijk netbeheer, 15 april. 
 
DTe, 2004b, Advies taken en activiteiten van de netbeheerder na splitsing, 16 december. 
 
DTe, 2004c, Standpuntendocument Decentrale Opwekking, Gevolgen van decentrale 
opwekking voor de regulering van elektriciteitsnetwerken, The Hague (in Dutch). 
http://www.dte.nl/images/12_18957_tcm7-4477.pdf  
EC, 2004, Third benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas 
markets. 
 
EC, 2005, Fourth benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas 
markets. 
  
ECN, RIVM, 2005, Referentieraming Energie en Emissies 2005-2020, Petten/Bilthoven, ECN-
C--05-018.   95 
Economides, N., 1998, The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 16: 271-84. 
Energiened, 2003, Energie Nederland Special, April 2003.  
 
EIA, 1996, Privatization and the Globalization of Energy Markets, DOE/EIA-0609(96), 
Washington DC, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/financial/060996.pdf 
Fraquelli, G., M. Piacenza, and D. Vannoni, 2004, Scope and scale economies in multi-utilities: 
evidence from gas, water and electricity combinations, Applied Economics, 36, pp. 2054-2057. 
 
Gilsdorf, K. 1995. “Testing for Subadditivity of Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities.” 
Southern Economic Journal, 62, 126-138. 
 
Giulietti, Waddams Price, Waterson, 2006, Redundant Regulation? Competition and Consumer 
Choice in Residential Energy Markets, Economic Journal, forthcoming. 
 
Green, R., 2003, Retail Competition and Electricity Contracts, CMI working paper 33, 
Cambridge, UK.  
 
Hart, O., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1997, The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and 
Application to Prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1091-1126. 
 
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt, 2005, Electricity Market Reform in the European Union: Review of 
Progress toward Liberalisation & Integration, University of Cambridge, March 24. 
 
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ovwnership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 11, pp. 5-50. 
 
Joskow, P., 2003a, The difficult transition to competitive electricity markets in the U.S., The 
Cambridge-MIT Institute, CMI-Working Paper 28. 
Joskow, P., 2003b, Vertical integration, forthcoming in Handbook of New Institutional 
Economics, Kluwer. 
 
Joskow, P., 2004, Transmission Policy in The United States, AEI Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, Washington D.C.  
Joskow, P., and J. Tirole, 2004, Retail Electricity Competition, mimeo, MIT and IDEI.   96 
Karpoff, J.A., 2001, Public versus Private Initiative in Arctic Exploration: The Effects of 
Incentives and Organizational Structure, Journal of Political Economy, 109, pp. 38-78. 
KEMA, 2004, Transportnetten in Nederland: 50 kV en hoger, report commissionned by 
TenneT. 
 
Kittelsen, S., 1993, Stepwise DEA. Choosing variables for measuring technical efficiency in 
Norwegian electricity distribution. Memorandum 6/93 from the Department of Economics, 
University of Oslo. 
 
KPMG, 2004, Onderzoek modelovereenkomst netbeheerder en leverancier binnen het 
leveranciersmodel, in opdracht van DTe, dossiernummer 101819. 
 
Künneke, R.W., 2003, Innovations in electricity networks, paper presented at the Research 
Symposium European Electricity Markets, The Hague, September 2003 
 
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT 
Press, Princeton. 
 
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, 1994, Access Pricing and competition, European Economic Review, 
vol 38, pp. 1673-710. 
 
Lijesen, M., 2002, End User prices in liberalised energy markets, CPB Discussion Paper 16. 
Lijesen, M.G. and B. Vollaard, 2004, Capacity to spare? A cost-benefit approach to optimal 
spare capacity in electricity production, CPB Document 60. 
London Economics, 2004, Structure and Functioning of the Electricity Market in Belgium in a 
European Perspective, final report to Le conseil général de la Commission de Régulation de 
l′Electricité et du Gaz.  
 
Mandy, D.M., 2000, Killing the goose that may have laid the golden egg: only the data know 
whether sabotage pays, Journal of Regulatory Economics 19(2): 157-72. 
 
Markiewicz, K., N.L. Rose, and C. Wolfram, 2004, Does Competition Reduce Costs ? 
Assessing the impact of Regulatory Restructuring on U.S. Electric Generation Efficiency, 
NBER Working Paper no. 11.001, December.   97 
Matsusaka, J.G., 2001, Corporate Diversification, Value Maximization, and Organiszational 
Capabailities, Journal of Business, 74(3), pp. 409-31. 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2004, Aanpak splitsing energiebedrijven, 11 oktober. 
Mota, R.L., 2004, Comparing Brazil and USA electricity distribution performance : what was 
the impact of privatisation?, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0423, Department of 
Applied Economics, University of Cambridge. Cambridge, UK.  
Newbery, D.M., 2002a, Issues and Options for Restructuring Electricity Supply Industries, 
University of Cambridge, CMI Working Paper 01. 
 
Newbery, D.M., 2002b, Regulatory Challenges to European Electricity Liberalisation, 
University of Cambridge, CMI Working Paper 12. 
 
NRC, 2005, Shell verkoopt Energiecentrales, 20 april 2005. (in Dutch). 
 
Ofgem, 2004a, Financial ring-fencing for new and existing independent gas transporters. Initial 
proposals, 12 November.  
 
Ofgem, 2004b, Electricity Distribution Price Control Review: Final Proposals, November 2004. 
 
Ofgem, 2005, Distributed Generation, Incentive Innovation Funding, Incentive Registered 
Power Zones, Regulatory Instructions and Guidance, Version 1. 
OECD, 2001, Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition. Competition and regulatory 
reform. 
 
OECD, 2003, The benefits and costs of structural separation, Working Party No.2 on 
Competition and Regulation, DAFFE/COMP/WP2(2003)2, January 10. 
 
OECD, 2004, Structural reform in the rail industry: should train operators be separated from the 
provision of the track infrastructure?, Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, 
DAF/COMP/WP2(2004)6, December. 
 
Pollitt, 1995, Ownership and performance in electric utilities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
UK. 
   98 
Pollitt, 1999, A survey of the liberalisation of public enterprises in the UK since 1979, 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9901, Cambridge, UK.  
 
Pollitt, 2004a, Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries, CMI working 
paper 51, Cambridge, UK.  
 
Pollitt, 2004b, Electricity Reform in Argentina: Lessons for Developing Countries, CMI 
working paper 52, Cambridge, UK.  
 
PWC (2004) Ring-fencing of municipal electricity businesses, practical first steps, presentation 
of February 20, 2004. 
 
Sequoia, 2004, Valuation and Financing of Unbundled Energy Companies, presentation at the 
CIEP Energy Market Seminar "Ownership valuation of Electricity and Gas Companies", The 
Clingendael Institute, February 9, 2005,  
 
Steiner, F., 2000. Regulation, industry structure and performance in the electricity supply 
industry. OECD Economics Department Working Paper, ECO/WKP 11. 
Timpe, C. and M.J.J. Scheepers, 2003, A look into the future: scenarios for distributed 
generation in Europe, Öko-Institut/ECN, 
http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2004/c04012.pdf 
Tirole. J., 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2004-2005, Liberalisering energiemarkten, 28 982, nr. 29. 
 
Varian, Hal. R., 2003, Intermediate Microeconomics; a modern approach, W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York, London. 
 
Wals A., E. Cross and E. van Sambeek, 2003, Review of current electricity policy and 
regulation - Dutch Study Case, ECN, http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2003/i03005.pdf  
Woolf, F. and J. Halpern, 2001, Integrating Independent Power Producers into Emerging 
Wholesale Power Markets, Policy Research Working Paper 2703, World Bank, Washington 
D.C. 
 